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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of competition on a firm’s choice of technology (product-flexible or product-
dedicated) and capacity investment decisions. Specifically, we model two firms competing with each other in
two markets characterized by price-dependent and uncertain demand. The firms make three decisions in the
following sequence: choice of technology (technology game), capacity investment (capacity game), and
production quantities (production game). The technology and capacity games occur while the demand curve
is still uncertain, and the production game is postponed until after the demand curve is revealed.
We develop best-response functions for each firm in the technology game and compare how a monopolist and
a duopolist respond to a given flexibility premium. We show that the firms may respond to competition by
adopting a technology which is the same as or different from what the competitor adopts. We conclude that
contrary to popular belief, flexibility is not always the best response to competition—flexible and dedicated
technologies may coexist in equilibrium. We demonstrate that as the difference between the two market sizes
increases, a duopolist is willing to pay less for flexible technology, whereas the decision of a monopolist is not
affected. Further, we find that a firm that invests in flexibility benefits from a low correlation between demands
for two products, but the extent of this benefit differs depending on the competitor’s technology choice. Our
results indicate that higher demand substitution may or may not promote the adoption of flexibility under
competition, whereas it always facilitates the adoption of flexibility without competition. Finally, we show that
contrary to intuition, as the competitor’s cost of capacity increases, the premium a flexible firm is willing to
pay for flexibility decreases.
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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to study the impact of competition on a firm’s technology choice (product-
flexible or product-dedicated) and capacity investment decisions. Specifically, we model two firms com-
peting with each other in two markets characterized by price-dependent and uncertain demand. The
firms make three decisions in the following sequence: choice of technology (technology game), capacity
investment (capacity game) and production quantities (production game). The technology and capacity
games occur while the demand curve is still uncertain and the production game is postponed until after
the demand curve is revealed.
We formally characterize a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium in the capacity and production games
and under suitable assumptions solve the games in closed form. Further, we develop best-response
functions for each firm in the technology game and compare how a monopolist and a duopolist respond
to a given flexibility premium. We show that the cost premium which the duopolist is willing to accept,
when investing in flexbile technology, is higher (smaller) than the premium which the monopolist is
willing to accept, if the competitor invests in dedicated (flexible) technology. Finally, we characterize
situations that give rise to each of the three possible equilibrium outcomes of the technology game: both
firms may invest in dedicated technology, both may invest in flexible technology or one firm may invest
in dedicated and the other in flexible technology. The last (asymmetric) outcome can arise even if firms
are perfectly symmetric.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, firms in a variety of industries have come under intense pressure to oﬀer a large variety
of products in response to highly variable and ever changing customer tastes. Consequently, in order to
compete eﬀectively in the marketplace, it is necessary to switch from manufacturing one product to another
with ease. The answer to this challenge came in the form of flexible manufacturing systems (FMS). Apart
from the obvious benefit of being able to hedge against uncertainty in demand (by cutting production of
goods for which demand turns out to be much lower than forecasted and increasing production of goods
that turn out to have high demand), some studies suggest that FMS also empowers the firm with other
advantages such as a strategic weapon against competition (see Fine 1993). Our aim in this paper is
to marry these two advantages of flexibility and study the strategic value of flexibility in an uncertain
environment characterized by inter-firm competition.
Though it seems beyond doubt that FMS is a powerful competitive weapon, we find that in practice
some companies still prefer to utilize dedicated technology (that can manufacture only a single product on
a production line). While dedicated technology does not provide a hedge against uncertainty, it typically
has the advantage of lower production costs. For instance, Upton (1995) studies 61 plants in the paper
industry, an industry in which products are quite comparable across manufacturers (e.g., letter-size paper)
and the same fundamental processes are used everywhere. Nevertheless, some firms have adopted flexible
manufacturing technology while others have not. Therefore, in the market, products manufactured by
diﬀerent companies - and hence diﬀerent technologies - compete directly.
The literature has showcased flexible manufacturing as a strategic competitive edge and as a hedge
against uncertainty (Fine 1993, Roller and Tombak 1991). For example, Mackintosh (2003) notes that
“... given all the benefits of flexibility, the surprise is that it has taken US manufacturers so long to start
emulating their Japanese rivals”. At the same time, normative models that actually quantify the benefits
of product flexibility and aid in decision making under both uncertainty and competition are hard to come
by. Moreover, given the evidence that dedicated and flexible technologies often co-exist, it is not at all clear
that investment in flexibility is a universal competitive response. We thus address the following questions:
What should the firm’s best response be if the competitor invests in flexible (dedicated) technology? Does
the technology investment depend on the competitor’s choice of technology? Is the impact of problem
parameters diﬀerent with and without competition? Since answers to these questions are diﬃcult to find
in the extant literature, this paper makes an attempt to fill this void.
Using a stylized model, we analyze the technology choice, dedicated (D) or flexible (F ) , of a firm under
competition in an environment with stochastic demand. We focus on product flexibility which entails the
ability to produce several products on the same capacity without incurring major switch-over costs as a
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response to uncertainty in demand1. Specifically, two firms each manufacture two products that are sold
in two markets. The firms can invest in either two dedicated (cheaper) production lines or one flexible
(more expensive) production line. Independent of the technology choice, both firms manufacture both
products and are in direct competition with each other in two diﬀerent markets. The firms make three
sequential decisions. The first is the choice of production technology (technology game). The second
is capacity investment given the technology decision (capacity game). These two decisions are ex-ante
before demand is revealed. Our setting, in which technology and capacity are decided before demand
uncertainty is resolved, reflects the long lead time involved in capacity acquisition. The final decision
concerns the quantities to be produced (production game) constrained by the earlier two decisions and is
ex-post (responsive manufacturing). The market price is a function of the total amount of product oﬀered
to the market by the two firms (Cournot competition).
We formally characterize a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) in the capacity and production
games. For ex-ante symmetric firms and under appropriate assumptions on the demand distribution, we
solve for the capacities in closed form and derive closed form expressions for expected prices and expected
profits. Further, we develop best-response functions for each firm for a given strategic choice of technology
by the rival as a function of the mean and the variance of the demand distribution and the costs of the
two technologies. The eﬀect of competition on the technology choice of firms is distilled by contrasting the
actions of a duopolist with those of a monopolist. We show that the cost premium which the duopolist
is willing to accept, when investing in flexible technology, is higher (smaller) than the premium which the
monopolist is willing to accept, if the competitor invests in dedicated (flexible) technology. Thereafter, we
establish the Nash Equilibrium in the technology game. We show that any of the two symmetric - (F,F )
and (D,D) - or two asymmetric - (D,F ) , (F,D) - equilibria can arise depending on the specific values
of the problem parameters. We show that the bias towards flexibility is increasing with rising demand
uncertainty, increasing cost of the dedicated technology, decreasing mean demand and increasing product
substitutability. Somewhat surprisingly, even when two firms are completely symmetric, it is possible for
an asymmetric equilibrium to emerge (i.e., flexible and dedicated technologies co-exist). This is because
when both firms invest in flexible technology, the benefit of flexibility gets divided between them. Since
flexible technology is expensive, one of the firm finds it profitable to invest in dedicated technology instead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys related literature while emphasizing the
positioning of our work. In Section 3 we formulate the stochastic 3-stage game and, moving backwards,
solve the last two stages using a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. In Section 4 the technology game is
solved under appropriate assumptions on the demand distribution and our findings are summarized and
discussed in Section 5.
1Hence, the flexible firm can adjust the allocation of capacity between products in response to demand uncertainty.
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2 Literature Survey
Two streams of literature are relevant to our study: the first explores flexibility as a hedge against demand
uncertainty and the second studies flexibility as a strategic weapon under competition. These are combined
in our study for we believe they are equally important in practice. To the best of our knowledge, there are
no other papers that model technology choice in a stochastic environment and under competition (Fine
1993 notes that there are only a few game-theoretic models that analyze competitive dynamics involving
flexible manufacturing technology). Some of the relevant papers specifically focus on the FMS while others
more generally analyze “flexible capacity” investment, either manufacturing or some other. We do not
make a distinction between FMS and flexible capacity since our model applies to both.
Papers in the first stream consider investment in flexible vs dedicated capacity in the absence of
competition and analyze the trade-oﬀ between the higher cost of flexible capacity and its ability to hedge
against demand uncertainty by manufacturing multiple products. All papers in this stream consider a
monopolistic firm. Fine and Freund (1990) model a firm manufacturing n products within two decision
epochs. In the first stage, the firm must choose the capacity levels for the n dedicated resources as well
as for one flexible resource that can manufacture all n products. In the second stage (after demand
realization) the firm decides on production quantities given the capacity constraints. Fine and Freund
(1990) show that the decision to invest in flexible technology is based on the cost diﬀerential between
the dedicated and flexible technologies. Van Mieghem (1998) develops a similar model and finds that
flexibility is beneficial even with perfect positive correlation if one product is more profitable than the
other. Other works that have looked at similar issues are Harrison and Van Mieghem (1998) and Netessine
et al. (2002). In all these papers, product prices are exogenous to the model. Chod and Rudi (2004)
endogenize pricing decisions and analyze a firm manufacturing two products while investing in a flexible
resource only. The capacity decision is ex-ante and the production decision is ex-post; moreover, the
price of a product is a function of production quantity. Hence, Chod and Rudi (2004) look at responsive
pricing and responsive manufacturing and categorize their impact on the management of a flexible resource.
They conclude that the flexible capacity and expected profits are increasing in demand variance, and that
positive correlation increases capacity investment while decreasing expected profits. Further, the benefits
of flexibility are quantified by comparing a firm investing in flexible technology with a firm investing in
two dedicated production lines under the assumption that investment costs for a flexible resource and
dedicated resources are the same. The work of Chod and Rudi (2004) is close to ours since we utilize
the same base model: the production/pricing decision is made after demand uncertainty is realized and
capacity investment is made before. However, we account for the diﬀerent costs of the two technologies
and, more importantly, introduce competition. As opposed to Chod and Rudi where flexibility was always
preferred, we provide conditions under which flexibility is not adopted in equilibrium or when it is adopted
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by one firm but not the other. Hence, the model of Chod and Rudi (2004) is a special case of ours. Bish
and Wang (2003) consider a problem setting similar to Chod and Rudi (2004) but allow the firm to invest
simultaneously into dedicated and flexible capacities.
The second stream of literature looks at the strategic value of flexibility in the absence of demand
uncertainty. Hence, flexibility is shown in the light of economies of scope. Fine and Pappu (1990) and
Roller and Tombak (1990, 1993) model two firms each manufacturing two products and competing with
each other. The firm investing in flexible technology can enter both markets, while the firm investing in
dedicated technology finds it economical to enter only one market. The technology choice is modeled as
a 2x2 game in strategic form. The firms are trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma like situation: while each
can choose one market and make monopoly profit in it, both end up choosing flexible technology and
hence intensifying competition under the threat that the rival might choose flexible technology and invade.
As a result, these papers show that flexible technology makes firms worse oﬀ. In addition, Roller and
Tombak (1990, 1993) show that both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria can exist and the prices are
lowest when both firms choose flexible technology. They also show that decreasing product substitutability
promote flexible technology. As opposed to Roller and Tombak, we model the situation in which the firm
investing in the dedicated technology participates in both markets. Hence, in our model flexibility does
not inherently fuel competition. Accordingly, prices in our model are not the lowest for the case in which
both firms invest in flexible technology (they are, in fact, the highest). Moreover, decreasing product
substitutability does not necessarily favor flexible technology in our work. The reason for this diﬀerence is
that we model demand stochasticity as opposed to the deterministic case analyzed by Roller and Tombak.
As detailed in section 4.4, the eﬀect of an increase in the substitutability parameter is to decrease the
“non-stochastic” component of the profit function (consistent with Roller and Tombak) and to increase
the “stochastic component” (not modeled in Roller and Tombak). In another related work, Anand and
Girotra (2003) analyze the benefits of delayed diﬀerentiation under competition. Delayed diﬀerentiation is
similar to manufacturing flexibility since it allows the firm to hedge against demand uncertainty. However,
in their model firms compete in one market only while being monopolists in the other market they serve.
Hence, the setup and resulting insights are very diﬀerent.
Several other papers that do not fit into the two streams above are, nevertheless, relevant to our work.
In their seminal paper, Jordan and Graves (1995) look at total flexibility vs partial flexibility through the
concept of chaining (a chain consists of product-plant links: more links correspond to higher flexibility).
They find that adding limited flexibility in the right place can achieve nearly all the benefits of total
flexibility in terms of hedging against demand uncertainty. Graves and Tomlin (2003) further extend this
work to a multi-echelon supply chain setting. Finally, Parker and Kapuscinski (2003) study the role of
flexible technology in entry deterrence (we do not model entry decisions).
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To summarize, the prior literature has only partially addressed the question of technology choice un-
der both demand uncertainty and competition: the focus has been on one or the other but not on both.
Since the value of flexibility as a hedge against demand uncertainty has attracted significant attention
in the literature, it seems imperative to understand how this value is aﬀected by competition. Such an
understanding will help us advise practicing managers on the strategic value of flexibility in a competitive
environment. Hence, we contribute to the extant literature on manufacturing/capacity flexibility by simul-
taneously studying the impact of both demand uncertainty and competitive pressures on the technology
choice of firms and attempting to bridge the gap between these two streams of literature. While our model
is somewhat similar to Roller and Tombak (1990, 1993) and Fine and Pappu (1990) in which a “two-firm
two-product” competitive scenario is modeled, we also incorporate demand uncertainty similar in spirit to
the works of Fine and Freund (1990), Van Mieghem (1998) and particularly Chod and Rudi (2004).
3 The Model
There are two firms indexed by i and j, i, j = 1, 2. The firms are assumed to be risk neutral and are
expected profit maximizers. Each firm manufactures two products indexed by y = 1, 2 and is engaged
in competition in both markets with the other firm. By making the market entry decision exogenous
to the model, we create a level playing field for the two technologies in terms of economies of scope
and hence isolate flexibility as a hedge against uncertainty in a competitive environment. As detailed in
the introduction, this is a three-stage sequential game: the technology game, the capacity game and the
production game. Each stage is a simultaneous-move non-cooperative game with complete information.
These are simplifying assumptions: in practice decisions might be neither simultaneous nor immediately
observable by the competitors. Relaxing these assumptions is a valuable direction for future research but is
outside of the scope of our paper. In the first stage, each firm can invest either in a flexible technology (F )
that manufactures both products on the same line or in a dedicated technology (D) for each of the products
separately. The firm cannot invest in flexible and dedicated technology simultaneously: this restriction
may be imposed in practice due to the administrative costs associated with producing the same product
in more than one production facility. Moreover, assuming that only one technology can be chosen allows
us to emphasize the trade-oﬀ of main interest: dedicated vs flexible technology.
Depending on the technology choices in the first-stage game, three equilibria (which we refer to as
markets) can potentially emerge. The superscripts refer to the type of market in which the firms operate:
(m) refers to the mixed market in which one firm invests in flexible and the other in dedicated technology
(also referred to as the D,F or F,D market), (f) refers to a pure flexible (F,F ) market and (d) refers
to a pure dedicated (D,D) market. The subscripts refer to the type of capacity, whether flexible (f) or
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dedicated (d), which can also be indexed by y for each of the products. If it is necessary to diﬀerentiate
firms, the firm index i, j will appear in the subscript as well.
In the second stage (the capacity game), each firm invests in production capacity (one capacity if the
firm pursues flexible technology and two capacities if the firm pursues dedicated technology) denoted by
K. For instance, Kffi is the flexible capacity of firm i in the pure flexible market. Capacity investment
is costly: let the cost of purchasing the flexible resource be cf per unit and the cost of the dedicated
resource be c per unit for each product with cf > c, which is similar to Fine and Freund (1990) and several
subsequent papers. Investment costs are linear in capacity and are the same for both firms, reflecting a
common set of technologies available to the competitors. The expected optimal profit of the firm in this
stage is denoted by Π so, for example, Πmdi denotes the expected profit of firm i competing in the mixed
market and investing in dedicated capacities Km1i and K
m
2i .
The last stage of the game is ex-post and is concerned with the quantities (denoted by q) to be put in
the market given the first two decisions and demand realization. This decision is ex-post, reflecting that
at the time of production the firm is better aware of market conditions. The inverse demand function for
product y is Py(Qy, Q3−y) = Ay−Qy−βQ3−y for all y = 1, 2 where Qy is the total quantity of product y put
in the market by the two firms combined (Cournot competition model). The parameter β ∈ (−1, 1) is the
cross-elasticity2 parameter where β > 0 (β < 0) signifies that the products are substitutes (complements)
in a Cournot game. Note that substitutability implies that the demand for a product increases with the
increase in price of the other product and vice versa for complementarity. The quantity of product y
put in the market by firm i is qyi so that Qy = qyi + qyj . The demand intercepts, Ay ∈ <+, are random
draws from a bivariate continuous distribution function F (., .) with a density function f(., .). Whenever
independence is assumed, the joint distribution simply becomes the product of the marginal distributions.
Denote the mean of the marginal distribution by µy and the variance by σ
2
y . Profits in the production
game are denoted by π.
The following standard conventions are used throughout. E denotes the expectation operator with
respect to the random variables Ay. The state-space for realizations of (A1, A2) is divided into disjoint sets
denoted by Ωl. To avoid trivialities, we impose the assumption that cf < µy, y = 1, 2 (i.e., marginal cost
is lower than expected maximum price — otherwise capacity investment is not profitable in expectation).
The marginal cost of production is assumed to be the same for both technologies (Fine and Pappu 1990,
Roller and Tombak 1990, 1993) and is normalized to zero. For expositional purposes, we now let β = 0
but this assumption will be relaxed in the last section.
We solve the problem backwards. The production game of the third stage is solved first and qyi and
2We use “cross-elasticity” term loosely in the paper to mean the measure of product substitutability/complementarity. The
mathematical definition of cross-elasticity is somewhat diﬀerent.
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qyj are obtained for every demand intercept realization. Using MPNE solutions in each stage, we work our
way backwards to the capacity decision and finally to the Nash Equilibrium in the technology game.
3.1 Problem formulation
Consider the technology game in Figure 1 that is schematically represented as a 2x2 matrix typical for
strategic-form games (e.g., Prisoner’s dilemma). Each firm is endowed with two strategies (D and F ) and
matrix entries signify second-stage profits.
D
F
F
D
Firm i
Firm j
d
j
d
i ΠΠ     ,  
f
j
f
i ΠΠ     ,  
m
fj
m
di ΠΠ     ,  
m
dj
m
fi ΠΠ     ,  
Figure 1. The technology game.
The equilibrium technology choice in Figure 1 is a pure strategy MPNE of the 2x2 non-cooperative
game in strategic form. As is typical for such games, the solution is obtained by considering the best-
response functions of each firm given the technology choice of the other firm. Since we are unable to
predict the equilibrium of the technology game up front, we proceed by analyzing capacity and production
choices in all possible equilibrium outcomes of the technology game. The optimization problem for a firm
i that invests in either a dedicated or a flexible technology in any market given some strategic choice by
rival (firm j) is
Firm i invests in dedicated technology Firm i invests in flexible technology
Πi = max
K1i,K2i
{EA (πi)− c (K1i +K2i)}
πi =max
q1i,q2i
2X
y=1
[(Ay − (qyi + qyj)) qyi]
s.t. 0 ≤ qyi ≤ Kyi, y = 1, 2.
Πi =max
Kfi
{EA(πi)− cf (Kfi)}
πi =max
q1i,q2i
2X
y=1
[(Ay − (qyi + qyj)) qyi] ,
s.t. q1i + q2i ≤ Kfi, qyi ≥ 0, y = 1, 2.
Table 1. The general problem formulation.
We now proceed by solving each of the three optimization problems (since markets D,F and F,D
are symmetric). Solutions for the quantity and capacity games are lengthy and tedious. Hence, we
provide only an outline of the methodology below (full solutions to the quantity game and structural
results concerning the existence/uniqueness of MPNE in capacities and production quantities as well as
optimality conditions for equilibrium capacity choices are found in Goyal and Netessine 2004). We then
impose certain assumptions on the distribution of demand intercepts to obtain solutions to the capacities
and the firm profits in closed form. Thereafter, the technology game is analyzed in full.
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3.2 The production and capacity games
In general, even though we assume that the two firms are ex-ante symmetric, it is possible that the
equilibrium outcome of the technology game is asymmetric. Moreover, even if two firms end up in a pure
(flexible or dedicated) market, i.e., a symmetric equilibrium, they might still select diﬀerent capacities. In
the Goyal and Netessine (2004), we solve production and capacity games for arbitrary (possibly asymmetric)
capacity choices. However, we focus here on symmetric equilibria in the capacity game. This is a standard
assumption in multi-stage Cournot games (see Salant and Shaﬀer 1999) and we are able to show that the
symmetric equilibrium in the capacity game in these markets is unique. Moreover this restriction does
not eliminate any equilibria in the technology game (i.e., the mixed market still arises) so the symmetry
assumption does not reduce the richness of the game.
1
3
6
9
A1
A2 f
f
f
fi
f
fj KKK ==
f
fKAA 321 =−
f
fKAA 321 =+
    3 ffK
    3 ffK
Figure 2. Pure flexible market
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A1
     3 1
dK
1
34
2
     3 2
dK
Figure 3. Pure dedicated market
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A2
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f KK 13      3
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mK
     3 mfK
m
f
mm KKKAA 22121 +−=−
m
fKAA 321 =−
m
fKAA 321 =+
m
f
m KKAA 422 121 +=−1
10
8
9
11
6
5
7
3
2
12
Figure 4. The mixed market.
We begin with the production game. Imagine that the firms have already played the earlier two stages
of the game, the technology and the capacity games, i.e., the firms are endowed with a technology (D
or F ) and a capacity level. In the last stage, firms play a constrained Cournot duopoly game (with
profits represented by π in Table 1). The visual state-space representation of the production game is given
in Figures 2-4 for all the three markets. Along the axes we have all possible realizations of the demand
intercepts3. Capacity constraints split the state-space into diﬀerent areas. For instance, consider the mixed
market (Figure 4): in area Ω1 none of the firms is capacity constrained, in area Ω11 both firms are capacity
constrained and in area Ω7 the dedicated firm is capacity constrained for product 1 and the flexible firm
manufactures only product 1 (due to a high enough realization of A1 as compared to A2), etc. In each
of the areas in all the markets, firms compete on Cournot quantities and hence, from standard economic
theory, we know that the equilibrium in the production game exists and is unique. The firms solve for
the optimal production quantities in each of the areas. Price is determined as per Cournot competition
and profits are gleaned. The expected profit Πi for a given capacity choice in each market is calculated
by weighing the profits in each of the areas by the probability of realizing that area. Diﬀerentiating this
3Remember that this is a game of complete information. Hence, each firm noiselessly observes the capacity and technology
choice of the other firm as well as the demand intercept realizations.
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expected profit gives us the first-order conditions for the capacity game.
4 The Technology game
Having analyzed the production and the capacity games, we are now ready to move ahead to the choice of
technology. However, the problem in its current form is rather intractable. Although optimality conditions
for capacities are available, they define capacities implicitly rather than explicitly since each integral in the
first-order conditions has limits Ωl, ∀l which depend on capacity decisions themselves. In order to solve
the technology game, we need to compare profits, which, needless to say, cannot be compared without first
obtaining capacity investment decisions in closed form. In order to simplify the problem, while making no
assumptions on the form of the marginal distributions for the demand intercepts, we do impose restrictions
on the domain of the distribution. These assumptions A-1 through A-3 are summarized below.
A-1. The first simplification is to assume that the probability distributions of demand intercepts are in-
dependent, i.e., dF (x1, x2) = f(x1)f (x2) dx1dx2. The main qualitative insights are invariant to this
assumption since correlation between products can easily be incorporated at the cost of added com-
plexity (see Chod and Rudi 2004). The impact of correlation is no diﬀerent in our model than what
has been shown in earlier works: negative correlation favors flexible technology and the advantage of
flexibility decreases as correlation rises.
A-2. We assume that both products are always manufactured by the flexible firm. This implies that it is
never the case that the demand intercept realization is so high for one product so as to render the
other product uneconomical. This is a plausible assumption from a practical perspective: it is highly
unlikely that a capacity able to produce two products would be built without a high enough level
of certainty that both products would actually be produced later on. As we will see shortly, such
an assumption does not take away the essence of the problem (hedging against demand uncertainty
under competition) as all the components of the problem (demand variability, cost diﬀerential, etc.)
are still at play. Mathematically, this translates to the following: in the pure flexible market, we
assume that Pr{(A1, A2) ∈ Ω6,9} = 0 (see Figure 2) and in the mixed market we assume that
Pr{(A1, A2) ∈ Ω7,8,9,10,12} = 0 (see Figure 4).
A-3. We assume that each firm follows a clearance strategy as opposed to a holdback strategy in all
markets. Clearance implies that firms always produce to capacity. This is a common assumption
in the literature; for example, in addition to Chod and Rudi (2004), it is used by Deneckere et al.
(1997), Anand and Girotra (2003). In practice, many firms find it diﬃcult to cut back production
below capacity in view of large fixed costs associated with production ramp-up and commitments to
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suppliers (these issues are not modeled explicitly here). For instance, as Mackintosh (2003) points
out, car makers have been forced to slash prices to keep lines running as models fall out of favor with
the public rather than keep plants idle. This implies that firms in the automotive industry follow
a strategy close to clearance. Mathematically, q1i + q2i = Kfi, i = 1, 2 if a firm invests in flexible
capacity and qyi = Kyi, y, i = 1, 2 if a firm invests in dedicated capacity.
Assumptions A-2 and A-3 are in the spirit of Chod and Rudi (2004). The result of assumptions A-2
and A-3 is that the only area having a non-zero probability is Ω3 in the pure flexible and the pure dedicated
markets and Ω11 in the mixed market. Even though our assumptions may actually hold naturally in many
problem settings, we nevertheless develop appropriate analytical restrictions on the domain of the prob-
ability distributions of demand intercepts. Hence, rather than assuming that firms behave sub-optimally
according to assumptions A-2 and A-3, we restrict the distribution of (A1, A2) so that assumptions A-2
and A-3 always hold (see Lemma 1 after Propositions 1, 2 and 3 which develop some results necessary to
prove the Lemma). Note also that Chod and Rudi (2004) test assumptions A-2 and A-3 numerically and
find that they generally yield solutions that are very close to optimal.
A few more comments are in order here. First, note that the clearance assumption essentially renders
trivial the last-stage (production) decisions for the firm investing in dedicated technology. However, the
firm investing in flexible technology (in both the pure flexible and the mixed market) still has to allocate
its capacity to each of the two products. Hence, production decisions are not trivial for a firm investing in
flexible technology and the capacity game and the production game still need to be considered separately.
Second, we need to worry about the non-negativity of prices in light of assumption A-3 (though negative
prices may be tenable in many situations). Non-negativity of prices was ensured as we essentially solved
a Cournot duopoly game in each of the areas for all three markets (this is shown formally in Goyal and
Netessine 2004). But now, by imposing A-3, we break away from the standard Cournot game in areas where
the capacity does not bind (such as area Ω1 in Figure 2) and non-negativity of prices cannot be assured in
these areas. However, by imposing Lemma 1, we ensure that no realization of demand intercepts is such
that we fall in these areas where the capacity does not bind. Hence, in eﬀect, by invoking the Lemma, we
automatically rule out non-negative prices.
We now obtain closed-form solutions and profit expressions for each of the three markets under the
above three assumptions. Note that since the solutions are unique, there is a unique equilibrium in the
capacity game in each of the three markets under these assumptions. The next three Propositions provide
the solution for the three markets (proofs are in Goyal and Netessine 2004).
Proposition 1 For firms operating in the pure flexible market,
(i) the MPNE in capacity is Kff = (µ1 + µ2 − 2cf )/3,
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(ii) the expected profit at equilibrium is Πff = (µ1 − cf )2/9 + (µ2 − cf )2/9 +
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
/18,
(iii) the expected price for a product y = 1, 2 is P fy = (µy + 2cf ) /3.
Note that while equilibrium capacity and prices are functions of the mean of the demand intercepts and
of the cost of flexible capacity only, profit is also an increasing function of the variance of the distribution
of the demand intercepts. Naturally, a higher cost of flexible capacity leads to higher prices, lower capacity
investment and lower profits. A higher mean of the demand intercepts leads to higher prices, capacities
and profits. All these results are similar to Chod and Rudi (2004). We consider the pure dedicated market
next.
Proposition 2 For firms operating in a pure dedicated market,
(i) the MPNE in capacity is Kdy = (µy − c)/3, y = 1, 2,
(ii) the expected profit at equilibrium is Πdi = (µ1 − c)2/9 + (µ2 − c)2/9, i = 1, 2,
(iii) the expected price for a product y = 1, 2 is P dy = (µy + 2c) /3.
The game in the pure dedicated market simplifies to the standard Cournot competition results since
the two markets are independent of each other. Finally, we turn to the mixed market.
Proposition 3 For the firms operating in the mixed market:
(i) the MPNE in capacity for a
(a) flexible firm is: Kmf = (µ1 + µ2 + 2c− 4cf ) /3,
(b) dedicated firm is: Kmy = (5µy − µ3−y + 4cf − 8c) /12, y = 1, 2,
(ii) the expected profit at equilibrium for a
(a) flexible firm is: Πmf = (µ1 − µ2)2/32 + (µ1 + µ2 + 2c− 4cf )
2 /18 +
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
/8,
(b) dedicated firm is: Πmd = (µ1 − µ2)2/16 + (µ1 + µ2 + 2cf − 4c)
2 /18,
(iii) the expected price for a product y = 1, 2 is Pmy = (7µ1 + µ2 + 8cf + 8c) /24.
The solution for the mixed marked is evidently the most convoluted. Now capacity choices and profits
of both firms depend on all problem parameters: e.g., optimal product-flexible capacity depends on the cost
of dedicated capacity and vice versa. We see that, quite intuitively, as c rises (cf falls), flexible capacity
rises, dedicated capacity falls, profit of the firm investing in dedicated capacity falls and profit of the firm
investing in flexible capacity rises. Prices, however, rise in both c and cf . The eﬀects of changing µs and
σs are intuitive as well.
Having derived the solution for the capacity game under assumptions A-1 through A-3, we now take
a step back and develop the lemma that specifies conditions under which assumptions A-2 and A-3 do
not alter the solution. In the interest of simplicity, we henceforth assume that the two distributions are
symmetric, i.e., µ1 = µ2 = µ and σ1 = σ2 = σ.
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Lemma 1 If there exist Amax and Amin such that Pr{A ∈ (Amin, Amax)} = 1 and Amax − Amin ≤
min [c, (4/3) (µ+ c− 2cf )], then A-2 and A-3 hold with probability one. In other words, A-2 and A-3
hold if cf does not exceed value cf(crit) = (µ+ c) /2− (3/8)min ((Amax −Amin) , c) .
Proof. We prove the lemma in two stages. We first develop bounds on the realizations A1 and A2
such that A-2 holds with probability one for the pure flexible and the mixed markets. We then develop
conditions under which A-3 holds. Combining the two completes the proof.
For the pure flexible market, A-2 holds if Pr
n
|A1 −A2| ≤ 3Kfhf
o
= 1 (we add a superscript h to
indicate that this is the optimal capacity under hold-back to distinguish it from the capacity derived
under A-1 through A-3). It can be shown that Kfhf > K
f
f . (Since Π
fh
i is concave, one can show that³
∂Πfhi /∂K
f
f
´
|
Kff
≥ 0; see Chod and Rudi 2004 for details). Hence, Pr
n
|A1 −A2| ≤ 3Kff
o
= 1 ⇒
Pr
n
|A1 −A2| ≤ 3Kfhf
o
= 1. For A-2 to hold in the pure flexible market, we must have
Pr {|A1 −A2| ≤ 2 (µ− cf )} = 1 by Proposition 1. Similarly for the mixed market, it is suﬃcient
to show that Pr
n
A1 −A2 < Kmh1 −Kmh2 + 2Kmhf
o
= 1 and Pr
n
A2 −A1 < Kmh2 −Kmh1 + 2Kmhf
o
= 1.
Since for a symmetric distribution Kmh1 = K
mh
2 , we have Pr
n
|A1 −A2| < 2Kmhf
o
= 1. Again one
can show that Kmf ≤ Kmhf . Hence, the necessary condition for A-2 to hold in the mixed market is
Pr {|A1 −A2| < (4/3) (µ+ c− 2cf )} = 1 by Proposition 3. Given that c < cf < µ, it can easily be
shown that (4/3) (µ+ c− 2cf ) < 2 (µ− cf ) . Hence, we have Pr {|A1 −A2| < (4/3) (µ+ c− 2cf )} = 1 for
A-2 to hold. This holds with probability one if |A1 −A2|max < (4/3) (µ+ c− 2cf ) or in other words if
Amax −Amin < (4/3) (µ+ c− 2cf ) .
If A-3 holds, then no realization of A1 and A2 falls in area Ω1 in Figures 2 and 4 and clearance is
optimal since it coincides with holdback. For this to happen we need
Pr
n
A1 +A2 > 3K
mh
f
o
= Pr
n
A1 +A2 > 3K
fh
f
o
= Pr
©
Ay > 3K
dh
y
ª
= 1 for y = 1, 2. Take the case of
a pure flexible market. Let Kfuf be the optimal capacity in the deterministic case when A1 = A2 = Amax.
Then,Kfuf = (2/3) (Amax − cf ) ≥ K
fh
f and Pr {A1 +A2 > 2 (Amax − cf )} = 1⇒ Pr
n
A1 +A2 > 3K
fh
f
o
=
1. For this to hold for all realizations of A, we must have Amin+Amin > 2 (Amax − cf ) or Amax−Amin < cf .
Similarly for the mixed market, Amax − Amin < 2cf − c and for the dedicated market Amax − Amin < c.
Hence, for clearance to be optimal we must have Amax−Amin < c. Taking the intersection of the conditions
for A-2 and A-3, we finally obtain Amax −Amin ≤ min [c, (4/3) (µ+ c− 2cf )] .
4.1 Comparison of prices and capacities
It is insightful at this point to compare the total capacity into which firms invest and the corresponding
(expected) prices in all possible technology equilibria (we continue working with symmetric distributions of
intercepts to minimize the number of variables). Under the clearance strategy, the total capacities translate
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directly into expected prices. Hence, we can compare prices/capacities across diﬀerent outcomes of the
technology game as follows:
Proposition 4 The total capacities in each of the markets compare as follows:
³
Kd1i +K
d
2i +K
d
1j +K
d
2j
´
>³
Kmf +K
m
1 +K
m
2
´
>
³
Kffi +K
f
fj
´
. The expected prices compare as follows: P f > Pm > P d.
The total capacity (of the two firms combined) is always lowest in the pure flexible market. This implies
that expected price is highest in a pure flexible market. This result is due to the cost diﬀerential between
the dedicated and flexible technologies (note that if c = cf all expected prices and capacities are the same).
This result is diﬀerent from some of the earlier works (see Roller and Tombak 1990, 1993 and Fine and
Pappu 1990) that model flexibility of scope in the sense that the flexible firm has the ability to serve
two markets while the dedicated firm serves a single market. Hence, in their models, flexibility enhances
competition. However, in our case, given that both firms serve both markets, the pure flexible market is
the least competitive (in the sense that prices are the highest). This result has found some support in the
popular press. For example, Mackintosh (2003) points out: “Introducing flexible technology in factories
should help moderate the fierce price wars under way in North America and Europe ...” which is consistent
with our analytical results.
4.2 Best-response functions
We are ready to characterize the best responses of the firms in the technology game. We characterize
the best response of firm i to a given technology choice for firm j and analogous results hold for the best
response of firm j. However, before we do this, it will be helpful to first look at how a monopolist would
behave under identical circumstances; that is, under which conditions would a monopolist choose dedicated
or flexible technology. This will help us in distilling the eﬀect of competition on the technology choice of
the firm. Suppose that the monopolist manufactures the same two products and invests in either one
flexible production line or two separate dedicated production lines. It can be shown that if the monopolist
invests in flexible technology, then under assumptions A-1 through A-3, his optimal capacity investment
is given by KMf = (µ− cf ) and he makes an expected profit of ΠMf =
¡
σ2/4
¢
+ (µ− cf )2 /2 (see Chod
and Rudi 2004 for details). If he invests in dedicated technology, then the capacity for the two products
combined is KMd = (µ− c) and the total expected profit is ΠMd = (µ− c)
2 /2. Comparing the two profits,
it is straightforward to show that for cf < cfM (µ,σ, c) =
µ
µ−
q
(µ− c)2 − σ2/2
¶
, the monopolist invests
in flexible technology and otherwise invests in dedicated technology.4
4Notice that we choose to express the monopolist’s decision in terms of a threshold on the cost of flexible capacity for we
feel that this is the most intuitive comparison. Evidently, the same could be done for c, µ and σ.
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For convenience, Table 2 below summarizes the profits for the firms for a given set of technology choices
in the competitive environment (the first entry is for the row player and the second entry is for the column
player).
D F
D (2/9) (µ− c)2, (2/9) (µ− c)2 (2/9) (µ+ cf − 2c)2,σ2/4 + (2/9) (µ+ c− 2cf )2
F σ2/4 + (2/9) (µ+ c− 2cf )2, (2/9) (µ+ cf − 2c)2 σ2/9 + (2/9) (µ− cf )2,σ2/9 + (2/9) (µ− cf )2
Table 2. Profit for each outcome of the technology game.
To characterize the best-response function for a firm i, we consider two possible choices of firm j:
investment in either flexible or in dedicated technologies.
Proposition 5 When firm j invests in dedicated technology
(i) The best response of firm i is to invest in flexible technology as long as cf < cf (µ, c,σ) where
cf (µ, c,σ) =
µ
µ+ c−
q
(µ− c)2 − (9/8)σ2
¶
/2.
Else firm i invests in dedicated technology.
(ii) cf (µ, c,σ) is convex increasing in σ
2, increasing in c and decreasing in µ.
(iii) cf (µ, c,σ) ≥ cfM (µ,σ, c) .
Proof. To show (i), define the incremental profit firm i will make by investing in flexible technology
rather than in a dedicated technology given that firm j invests in dedicated technology as
∆ΠF−Dji = {Πmfi −Πdi | firm j invests in dedicated technology}
= σ2/4 + (2/9) (µ+ c− 2cf )2 − (2/9) (µ− c)2.
The best response of firm i is to invest in flexible technology as long as ∆ΠF−Dji > 0 or else it invests in
dedicated technology. We will look for the best-response function vis-a-vis the cost of flexible capacity.
∆ΠF−Dji is quadratic convex in cf . Roots can be found as
µ
µ+ c±
q
(µ− c)2 − (9/8)σ2
¶
/2 and call the
lower root cfL and the upper root cfU . It can be shown that the minima of the convex curve is achieved
for cf = (µ+ c) /2 = cf min > cf(crit). Also by geometry we know that cfL ≤ cf min ≤ cfU . Since the upper
root is always above the critical value cf(crit) we can safely ignore it.
5 By convexity, ∆ΠF−Dji > 0 for
5Observe that, without the restriction cf > cf(crit), we would be left with an unsatisfying result that the flexible technology
becomes more attractive as the cost of flexibility increases for some set of problem parameters. This observation further justifies
our eﬀort in developing a proper technical condition in Lemma 1 rather than assuming that the firm behaves suboptimally
according to A-2 and A-3.
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cf < cfL = cf and the result follows. Result (ii) can be shown through diﬀerentiation. To show (iii),
observe first that for σ = 0, cf (µ, c,σ) = cfM (µ, c,σ) = c. For σ > 0,
∂cf/∂
¡
σ2
¢
= (9/32)
µq
(µ− c)2 − (9/8)σ2
¶−1
> (1/4)
µq
(µ− c)2 − σ2/2
¶−1
= ∂cfM (µ,σ, c) /∂
¡
σ2
¢
.
Hence, cf (µ, c,σ) increases faster in σ
2 than cfM (µ,σ, c) does so that cf (µ, c,σ) ≥ cfM (µ,σ, c) .
The above proposition gives us the best response to a competitor investing in dedicated capacity in the
form of a threshold value for cf , cf (µ, c,σ) . Hence, for c < cf < cf (µ, c,σ) the best response of firm i to
a choice of dedicated technology by firm j is to invest in flexible technology. For cf > cf firm i usually
invests in dedicated technology, but not always since for σ2 > 8/9 (µ− c)2 , cf /∈ < (in other words, the
equation ∆ΠF−Dji = 0 has no real roots). This implies that for high enough variance firm i will always
prefer flexible technology if firm j invests in dedicated technology.
cf (µ, c,σ) is a function that is convex increasing in the variance of the distribution of the intercepts.
Hence, the higher the variance, the higher the threshold and firm i prefers flexible technology for a wider
range of costs cf . Furthermore, the threshold also increases in the cost of dedicated technology and
decreases in the mean of the demand intercepts. Finally, from part (iii) of the proposition we obtain the
impact of the competitive presence on the behavior of a firm. Visual representation of this result is shown in
Figure 5, where the cost threshold of the monopolist is juxtaposed against the cost threshold of a duopolist
when the competitor invests in dedicated technology. Note that cf (µ, c,σ) > cfM (µ,σ, c) and cf (µ, c,σ)
is more convex. Hence, when a firm faces competition and the competitor invests in dedicated technology,
the firm invests in flexible technology for a wider range of costs than it would without any competition.
In other words, competition raises the threshold beyond which flexible technology is not desirable. Yet
another way to emphasize this eﬀect is to say that for cfM (µ,σ, c) < cf < cf (µ, c,σ) , a firm facing no
competition would not invest in a flexible resource but a duopolist would when there is a competitor who
invests in dedicated technology. We now turn to analyzing the best response to a competitor investing in
flexible technology.
Dedicated
2σ
fc
c
Infeasible Region
Flexible
( )critfc
( )σµ ,,cc fM
( )σµ ,,cc f
Figure 5. Best response to the dedicated technology.
Dedicated
2σ
fc
c
Infeasible Region
Flexible
( )critfc
( )σµ ,,cc fM
( )σµ ,,cc f
Figure 6. Best response to the flexible technology.
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Proposition 6 When firm j invests in flexible technology
(i) The best response of firm i is to invest in flexible technology as long as cf < cf (µ, c,σ) where
cf (µ, c,σ) = c+ σ
2/ (8 (µ− c)) .
Else firm i invests in dedicated technology.
(ii) cf (µ, c,σ) is linearly increasing in σ
2, increasing in c and decreasing in µ.
(iii) cf (µ, c,σ) ≤ cfM (µ,σ, c).
Proof. Similar to the previous proposition, define
∆ΠF−Fj =
n
Πfi −Πmdi | firm j invests in flexible
o
= σ2/9 + (2/9) (µ− cf )2 − (2/9) (µ+ cf − 2c)2,
which is the incremental profit that firm i makes by choosing flexible technology over dedicated technology.
Firm i invests in flexible technology as long as ∆ΠF−Fj > 0. It is easy to verify that ∆ΠF−Fj is linearly
decreasing in cf . The root of the equation∆ΠF−Fj = 0 is cf (µ, c,σ) = c+σ
2/8 (µ− c) . Hence, ∆ΠF−Fj >
0 for cf < cf (µ, c,σ) and the result follows. To show (iii), observe that for σ = 0, cf (µ, c,σ) = cfM (µ,σ, c) .
For σ > 0, it is easy to see that
∂cf (µ, c,σ) /∂
¡
σ2
¢
= (1/8) (µ− c)−1 < (1/4)
µq
(µ− c)2 − σ2/2
¶−1
= ∂cfM (µ,σ, c) /∂
¡
σ2
¢
and the result follows.
Similar interpretation can be attached to cf (µ, c,σ) with respect to the three variables as was done
for cf (µ, c,σ) . This time, however, comparing the decision of a duopolist with that of a monopolist gives
an opposite interpretation. From Figure 6, we see that the duopolist’s best response when the competitor
invests in flexible technology lies below the threshold curve for a monopolist. This means that when a firm
faces competition and the competitor invests in flexible technology, the firm invests in flexible technology
over a smaller range of costs than it would if there were no competition. For example, for costs such that
cf (µ,σ, c) < cf < cfM (µ, c,σ) , a monopolist invests in flexible capacity while a duopolist does not if there
is a competitor investing in flexible technology.
The above two propositions show that a firm behaves diﬀerently under competition when making its
technology choice than without competition. When the rival invests in dedicated technology, the firm is
more insensitive to the cost of flexible technology than a monopolist and invests in it for higher costs. On
the other hand, if the rival firm invests in flexible technology, the firm’s cost threshold curve dips below
that of a monopolist. The firm is now more cost sensitive and finds it economically viable to invest in
flexible technology for lower costs than a monopolist. We provide the following intuition behind this result.
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It is convenient to think about total market potential as consisting of two parts: one is deterministic and
depends on the mean of the demand intercepts, while the other is stochastic and depends on the variance
of the distribution of the demand intercepts. Recall further that profit of the firm investing in dedicated
technology depends on the mean of the demand intercepts, but the profit of the firm investing in flexible
technology also depends on (it is actually increasing in) the variance of the distribution of the demand
intercepts. Hence, the firm investing in flexible technology is able to appropriate both deterministic and
stochastic components of the market potential while the firm investing in dedicated technology is able to
appropriate only the deterministic component. Further, given that the competitor invests in dedicated
technology, the firm ought to anticipate that he will use all his capacity in each market. This reduces the
deterministic component of the market potential but leaves the stochastic component unchanged. Hence,
flexible technology is more attractive. If, in contrast, the competitor invests in flexible technology, the
firm should anticipate that he will chase the larger market once demand intercepts are realized. This, in
eﬀect, dampens the variability that the firm perceives: a spike in the size of one market due to a favorable
demand realization will be moderated by the competitor flooding that market. The eﬀective variability
falls and flexible technology is less valuable.
Hence, if only one firm in the market invests in flexible technology, this firm enjoys higher benefits from
uncertainty (the threshold cost in Figure 5 is convex increasing). However, if two firms invest in flexible
technology, the benefits to each firm from the stochastic component gets divided (the threshold cost in
Figure 6 is linear increasing). Hence, we conclude that flexibility is more valuable when the competitor
is not using it. Conversely, when the competitor is using flexible technology, the benefits of flexibility
diminish.
4.3 The Nash Equilibrium of the technology game
The best-response functions derived in the previous section put us in a position to determine the equilibria
for the technology game. We limit our analysis only to the pure strategy equilibria that are described in
the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The Nash equilibrium in the technology game is characterized as follows:
Case 1: cf < cf (µ, c,σ) then (F,F) is the unique MPNE.
Case 2: cf > cf (µ, c,σ) then (D,D) is the unique MPNE.
Case 3: cf (µ, c,σ) < cf < cf (µ, c,σ) then (F,D) and (D,F) are the two MPNE.
The Nash Equilibrium in the technology game is illustrated in Figure 7, which is obtained by merging
Figures 5 and 6. Roughly speaking, low uncertainty and high cost of flexibility lead to an equilibrium
in which both firms prefer dedicated technology, and high uncertainty and low cost of flexibility lead to
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an equilibrium in which both firms invest in flexible technology. These results are expected given the
knowledge of choices that the monopolist makes. What is more interesting is that the interplay between
the two upper bounds for the cost of flexibility, each for a diﬀerent strategy by the other firm, results
in the interesting case of an asymmetric equilibrium even though the two firms are entirely symmetric.
This observation suggests that diﬀerent technologies may co-exist in a competitive market and no firm
will want to deviate from its choice, which is consistent with Upton (1995). Of course, in the asymmetric
equilibrium, a natural question arises as to which firm would choose dedicated technology and which firm
would choose flexible technology. One possible solution to resolve this indeterminacy is mixed strategies:
each firm would select either F or D with some probability such that in equilibrium, each is indiﬀerent
towards choosing F or D. Finally note that the response of a monopolist as measured by the threshold
cost cfM (µ,σ, c) is shown against the two best responses of a duopolist in Figure 7. In some sense, a
monopolist’s behavior averages out the limiting behavior of a duopolist.
(D,D)
2σ
fc
c
Infeasible Region
(F,F)
( )critfc
( )σµ ,,cc fM
( )σµ ,,cc f
( )σµ ,,cc f
(D,F) and (F,D)
Figure 7. Nash Equilibrium in the technology game.
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Figure 8. Pure flexible market, β > 0.
4.4 Dependent products: cross-elasticity of demand
In the previous analysis we have made an assumption that the two products manufactured by firms are
entirely independent, i.e., the price of one product does not depend on the price/amount put on the
market of the other product. In practice, however, we would expect some level of complementarity or
substitutability between the products. Hence, we now relax the independence assumption between the two
products and allow the demand to be linked by a cross-elasticity parameter.
In this section, we look into a pure flexible market in some detail. Specifically, we look at how the
cross-elasticity parameter aﬀects the production game and how the state space of the problem is modified.
The intuition gained here applies equally well to the other two markets and hence we do not reproduce the
modified state-space representation for them. Under assumptions A-1 through A-3 we solve the capacity
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game explicitly. Thereafter, we show how our results are modified by the cross-elasticity parameter.
Consider the case of the pure flexible market. To gain intuition with regard to the impact of the
cross-elasticity parameter, consider the production game under the assumption that there is no capacity
constraint. It is easy to show that the profit-maximizing quantity for a firm in any of the markets for
product y is quny = (Ay − βA3−y) /3(1− β2). Evidently, for Ay < βA3−y, quny < 0, production quantity is
negative. Hence, given β > 0, there is a set of demand intercept realizations for which it is never optimal
to produce product y and consequently modification of the state space is needed to ensure quantities are
non-negative. This is shown for the pure flexible market in Figure 8 (for expositional convenience, we
restrict our attention to a symmetric case). By this, we also ensure that prices are non-negative since in
eﬀect we solve a Cournot Game with non-negative optimal quantities in each of the areas (see Goyal and
Netessine (2004) for details).
Areas Z1 and Z2 do not appear without cross-elasticity. In these areas, it is never optimal to manu-
facture products 2 and 1, respectively. Contrast this with the cases in which β = 0 and β < 0. For the
former, unless the demand intercept realization for product y, Ay, is zero, the unconstrained production
quantity is strictly positive. However, for β > 0, even though 0 < Ay < A(3−y)β, it is optimal not to
manufacture product y. For β < 0, even though Ay = 0, it is still optimal to manufacture product y
(quny = A(3−y)β/3(1 − β2)). Here is the intuition: when β < 0, the quantity demanded for product y
increases as the quantity of product (3− y) increases since the products are complements. Hence, even
though the demand for a product is zero, due to its positive impact on the sale of the other product, it
may still be beneficial to manufacture it. For instance, companies manufacture and sell printers at a loss
and make money on the cartridges.
To summarize, the eﬀect of β > 0 is to squish the state space by bringing the two vertical axes closer
together. This gels well with the notion of substitutability: because the products are substitutable (or in
other words are similar), the state space is no longer defined by a set of perpendicular boundaries. Rather,
the two axes come closer together as β increases. Hence, as β → 1, the production area in the pure flexible
market approaches zero (there is no need for flexible capacity). Note that the equations that define the
various boundaries of the state space are now a function of β. It is easy to see that Figure 8 merges into
Figure 2 for β = 0. Similar conclusions follow for the pure dedicated and the mixed markets. It is worthwhile
to note that the products being substitutable has no connection to the dependence/independence of the
distributions for the demand intercepts.
In Goyal and Netessine (2004) we show that the symmetric equilibrium in the capacity game for the
pure dedicated market is unique for β < 1/3 and for the pure flexible market it is unique for all β.We now
move on to the solution of the game under assumptions A-1 through A-3 and β < 1/3. In Tables 3 and 4
below we summarize optimal capacities and profits.
20
D F
D 2(µ− c)/3 (1 + β) , 2(µ− c)/3 (1 + β) 2(µ+ cf − 2c)/3 (1 + β) , 2(µ+ c− 2cf )/3 (1 + β)
F 2(µ+ c− 2cf )/3 (1 + β) , 2(µ+ cf − 2c)/3 (1 + β) 2(µ− cf )/3 (1 + β) , 2(µ− cf )/3 (1 + β)
Table 3. Total capacities for each outcome of the technology game.
D F
D
2(µ− c)2
9 (1 + β)
,
2(µ− c)2
9 (1 + β)
2(µ+ cf − 2c)2
9 (1 + β)
,
σ2
4 (1− β) +
2(µ+ c− 2cf )2
9 (1 + β)
F
σ2
4 (1− β) +
2(µ+ c− 2cf )2
9 (1 + β)
,
2(µ+ cf − 2c)2
9 (1 + β)
σ2
9 (1− β) +
2(µ− cf )2
9 (1 + β)
,
σ2
9 (1− β) +
2(µ− cf )2
9 (1 + β)
Table 4. Profit for each outcome of the technology game.
The following observations are in order. The capacity investment decreases in β for all markets.
Hence, the more substitutable the products, the lower the investment in capacity. This is consistent with
the findings of earlier papers modeling cross-elasticity (e.g.,. Roller and Tombak 1993). However, more
interesting is the behavior of the profit function for each of the markets. It is easy to see that the profit
unambiguously decreases in β for the firms investing in dedicated technology in both the pure dedicated
and the mixed markets. For the firm investing in flexible technology, however, there are two diﬀerent
directions in which the profit can move with an increase in cross-elasticity.
The eﬀect of an increase in β is to amplify the profit contribution of the stochastic term and reduce the
profit contribution of the non-stochastic term (i.e., terms depending on variance and the mean of demand
intercepts, correspondingly). That the non-stochastic portion of the profit decreases in β is consistent
with previous findings (Roller and Tombak 1993). But the stochastic portion was not modeled in earlier
works. One possible explanation for the increase in the stochastic component with β is that for β > 0,
the products are strategic substitutes resulting in negative externality (∂2πi/∂qy∂q3−y = −β < 0). This
implies that the demand for product y falls with the rise in demand for product (3− y) all else held
constant. Hence, the demands for the two products move in opposite directions. With high variance, one
therefore gets troughs and crests in demand for the two products, which the flexible capacity is better
able to cope with. With complementary products, demand falls and rises in tandem for the two products.
Hence, the benefit of flexibility is less with the rise in variance. On a more analytical note, the profit
for the flexible firm is convex in β. Hence, there exists a β∗ (µ, cf ,σ) such that for β > β
∗, the profit for
the flexible firm is increasing in β and for β < β∗ it is decreasing in β. For instance, in a pure flexible
market, β∗f (µ, cf ,σ) =
¡
(µ− cf )− σ/
√
2
¢
/
¡
(µ− cf ) + σ/
√
2
¢
. Observe that β∗f decreases in σ. Similar
observations can be made for the mixed market.
Let us now focus on the form of the best-response thresholds, cf and cf , and the way they depend on
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β. It can be shown that
cf (µ,σ, c,β) =
µ
µ+ c−
q
(µ− c)2 − (9/8)σ2 (1 + β) / (1− β)
¶
/2,
cf (µ,σ, c,β) = c+
¡
(1/8)σ2 (1 + β) / (µ− c) (1− β)
¢
.
We suggest the following way to think about the impact of β on the equilibrium of the technology game.
The impact of β is to modify the variance from σ2 to eσ2 = (1 + β)σ2/ (1− β). Note that eσ2 is convex
increasing in β. Hence, the eﬀect of β on the two thresholds reinforces the eﬀect of variance even further.
Recall that cf was convex increasing in σ
2. Hence, with increasing β the convexity is amplified and bias
towards flexible technology for high variance increases with increasing and positive β. The same holds for
cf . In fact, this threshold was linear in the variance for β = 0 but now it increases in a convex manner
with rising β.
To summarize our discussion of the impact of cross-elasticity, it is safe to say that as products become
more substitutable, firms are more favorably inclined towards investing in flexible technology.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have looked at the technology choice and capacity investment of firms facing stochastic
price-dependent demand in a competitive market. Each firm makes three decisions: technology choice,
capacity choice and production quantity choice. Hence, we cover all three levels of firms’ decisions: strate-
gic, tactical and operational. We proved that the equilibrium exists and that the symmetric equilibrium is
unique for the capacity game under rather general conditions, and we derived optimal production quanti-
ties and capacities. After simplifying the problem appropriately, we were able to solve the entire game in
closed form. We developed the best responses of the firms in the technology game and compared the best
response of a duopolist with the behavior of a monopolist. We concluded that flexibility becomes more
valuable when the rival firm invests in dedicated technology. On the other hand, if the rival invests in flex-
ible technology, the value of flexibility diminishes. The intuition behind this result is as follows. The total
market potential consists of two parts: one is deterministic and depends on the mean demand, while the
other is stochastic and depends on the variance of the demand distribution. The firm investing in flexible
technology is able to appropriate both deterministic and stochastic components of the market potential
while the firm investing in dedicated technology is able to appropriate only the deterministic component.
We showed that all four equilibria - (F,F ) , (D,D) , (D,F ) and (F,D) - could result depending on the spe-
cific values of the problem parameters. Specifically, asymmetric equilibria can result even if the two firms
are completely symmetric and hence diﬀerent technologies might co-exist in the market. We generalized
our findings to incorporate cross-elasticity and showed that as products become more substitutable, the
value of flexibility rises.
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Our findings provide systematic answers to questions regarding the value of flexibility as a competitive
weapon. Anecdotal evidence from the popular press suggests that flexibility is universally “good” in a
competitive environment. Our results, however, point out that a variety of equilibrium outcomes are
possible, including some in which both firms invest only in dedicated capacity or two diﬀerent production
technologies may co-exist. We also identify technology choice as an important dimension of competition
that can alleviate other dimensions of competition (e.g., on price). Overall, we show that flexible technology
is not a panacea for all evils — there are conditions under which dedicated technology emerges in equilibrium.
Our results come with several limitations. In our work we did not endogenize economies of scope.
Further, we did take a restrictive view of flexibility as product flexibility only and not, for example, volume
flexibility. By incorporating reduction in lead times, economies of scope, and the advantage for new product
development, the benefits of flexibility would definitely be increased further. It would also be interesting
to study flexibility as an entry deterrence tool under stochastic demand. Moreover, allowing the flexible
firm to enter another market, i.e., allowing it to manufacture a third product would influence the choice
of technology for the rival firm. Many firms have focused on the role of flexible technology on developing
prototypes thereby drastically shortening the time to market for a new product development. However,
analytic models to this eﬀect are few. This should prove to be an interesting problem for further research.
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technical appendix to:
Strategic Technology Choice and Capacity
Investment under Demand Uncertainty.
Manu Goyal∗ Serguei Netessine†
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In this technical appendix, we detail the solutions to the production game. Further, we formally
show the existence of equilibrium in the capacity game for all three markets and prove that the sym-
metric equilibrium in capacity choice is unique for the pure flexible and the pure dedicated markets.
Finally, we formally derive optimal capacities, profits and prices under assumptions A-1 through A-3
for all three markets for a general case of β 6= 0 and formally show non-negativity of ex-post prices in
the pure flexible market1.
Recall that the price for product y is Py (Qy,Q3−y) = Ay −Qy − βQ3−y. Profit expressions for the
last-stage production game can be calculated as follows:
bπxi = 2X
y=1
Py
³ bQy, bQ3−y´ bqxyi = 2X
y=1
³
Ay −
³bqxyi + bqxyj´− β ³bqx(3−y)i + bqx(3−y)j´´ bqxyi (1)
where x = f, d,m depending on the type of market in which the firm operates (pure flexible, pure
dedicated or mixed). The superscript ˆdenotes the optimal values of profits/decision variables.
Bold letters denote vectors. All vectors are column vectors and the superscript T denotes the trans-
pose. For example, AT represents the vector (A1, A2). All vectors are compared component-wise.
For the production game, we assume that the firms follow the optimal holdback strategy, i.e., the firm
produces the optimal profit maximizing quantity in the production game subject to capacity constraints.
∗goyalm@wharton.upenn.edu
†netessine@wharton.upenn.edu
1The non-negativity of prices is shown in the pure flexible market for illustrative purposes only. Proofs for the other
markets are along similar lines.
1
If necessary, the firm holds back some capacity in case the optimal production quantity is less than
installed capacity.
1 The pure flexible market
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Figure 1. Pure flexible market - asymmetric solution, β = 0.
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Figure 3. Pure flexible market-symmetric solution, β > 0.
Suppose both firms decide to invest in flexible technology that can produce both products and
2
consider the last stage of the game (the production game). Assume without any loss of generality that
firm j has a higher capacity than firm i, i.e., the outcome of the capacity game is such that Kffi ≤ K
f
fj .
Given these capacities and a vector of demand realizations AT , firms decide upon production quantities.
The decision for one firm in isolation has been obtained by Chod and Rudi (2004). For two firms, the
last-stage optimization problem can be formulated using Lagrange multipliers as follows:
max Lfi (ui, q
f
1i, q
f
2i) =
2X
y=1
³
Ay − (qfyi + q
f
yj)
´
qfyi − ui
³
qf1i + q
f
2i −K
f
fi
´
, i = 1, 2. (2)
Combinations of the Lagrange multipliers and the slack variables give rise to 9 diﬀerent optimization
problems. It is convenient to represent the possible outcomes of the production game using the state-
space diagram in Figure 12. The various areas have an intuitive explanation. For instance, area
Ω1 represents the set of demand realizations such that no firm is capacity constrained. Similarly,
area Ω3 represents the case in which both firms are capacity constrained. For area Ω2, only firm i
is capacity constrained. Areas Ω6 and Ω9 arise when the demand for one product is so high that,
when the firms are capacity constrained, they prefer to manufacture only one product. In areas Ω4
and Ω7, firm i is capacity constrained while firm j is not, whereas in areas Ω5 and Ω8 both firms are
capacity constrained. Moreover, in these last four areas, firm i finds it economical to produce only one
product but firm j produces both products. A mathematical description of the areas follows (we assume
Ay ≥ βA3−y, y = 1, 2 to ensure non-negativity of quantities):
Ω1 =
n
A : 1TA ≤ 3Kffi (1 + β)
o
,
Ω2 =
n
A : 1TA ≥ 3Kffi (1 + β) ,1
TA ≤
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´
(1 + β) , |A1 −A2| ≤ 3Kffi (1− β)
o
,
Ω3 =
n
A : 1TA ≥
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´
(1 + β) , |A1 −A2| ≤ 3Kffi (1− β)
o
,
Ω4,7 =
n
A : |A1 −A2| ≥ 3Kffi (1− β) ;1TA ≥ 3Kffi (1 + β) ,1TA ≤
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´
(1 + β)
o
,
Ω5,8 =
n
A : 3Kffi (1− β) ≤ |A1 −A2| ≤
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´
(1− β) ;1TA ≥
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´
(1 + β)
o
,
Ω6,9 =
n
A : |A1 −A2| ≥
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´
(1− β)
o
.
In each area, the production game can be solved in closed form (and the MPNE is trivially unique).
The first-order KKT conditions are (it is straightforward to verify that the objective function is concave
so these conditions are also suﬃcient):
A1 − 2qf1i − q
f
1j − β
³
qf2i + q
f
2j
´
− βqf2i − ui + v1i = 0,
v1iq
f
1i = 0,
2Note that though Figure 1 is for β = 0, the solutions are expressed for β 6= 0. Figure 2 represents a symmetric flexible
market with β = 0 and Figure 3 represents a symmetric market with β > 0.
3
A2 − 2qf2i − q
f
2j − β
³
qf1i + q
f
1j
´
− βqf1i − ui + v2i = 0,
v2iq
f
2i = 0,
qf1i + q
f
2i + v3i = K
f
fi,
uiv3i = 0,
where vli are the slack variables. For firm j we have similar expressions with the Lagrange multipliers
and the slack variables labelled as uj , vlj , l = 1, 2, 3. The expressions for optimal quantities and profits
for the various areas of the state-space diagram are obtained by taking appropriate values of the various
Lagrange multipliers and the slack variables. Unless specified otherwise, all quantities will be assumed
to be positive and hence the slack variables vli = vlj = 0 for l = 1, 2.
Capacity is not binding (area Ω1).
ui = uj = 0 and v3i,v3j > 0 by complementary slackness. Solving for quantities we get
bqfyi = bqfyj = Ay −A3−yβ3 (1− β2) ,
Py =
Ay
3
.
The quantities are non-negative as long as Ay ≥ A3−yβ. As shown in Figure 3, this is true as long as
we are outside areas Z1 and Z2. The prices are, of course, positive.
Capacity is binding for firm i but not for firm j (area Ω2).
ui > 0 while uj = 0. From complementary slackness, we have,
bqfyi = Ay −A3−y6 (1− β) + K
f
fi
2
, bqfyj = ((5− β)Ay + (1− 5β)A3−y)12 (1− β2) − K
f
fi
4
,
Py =
5Ay +A3−y − 3 (1 + β)Kffi
12
for y = 1, 2.
It can also be shown that ui = (1/4)
³
A1 +A2 − 3Kffi (1 + β)
´
> 0 and v3j > 0 ⇒ (A1 +A2) ≤³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´
(1 + β) , which gives the defining equation for Ω2 when β = 0 in Figure 1. The price
is non-negative if 5Ay + A3−y ≥ 3 (1 + β)Kffi. However, we know that
³
A1 +A2 − 3Kffi (1 + β)
´
> 0
since ui > 0. Hence prices are non-negative.
Capacity is binding for both firms (area Ω3).
ui, uj > 0. Solving for quantities we get
bqfyi = Ay −A3−y6 (1− β) + K
f
fi
2
, bqfyj = Ay −A3−y6 (1− β) + K
f
fj
2
,
4
Py =
4Ay + 2A3−y − 3 (1 + β)
³
Kffi +K
f
fj
´
6
, y = 1, 2.
uj = (1/2)
³
A1 +A2 −
³
Kffi + 2K
f
fj
´
(1 + β)
´
> 0 gives the defining equation for Ω3 in Figure 1.
Quantities are non-negative if A3−y − Ay ≤ 3Kffi (1− β) . To show that prices are non-negative is
a bit more involved. We shall show the non-negativity of prices for β ≥ 0. It may be noted that
if prices are non-negative for β ≥ 0, then they are non-negative everywhere. The prices are non-
negative if 4Ay + 2A3−y ≥ 3 (1 + β)
³
Kffi +K
f
fj
´
. We know that Ay + A3−y ≥ 3 (1 + β)Kffi and
Ay +A3−y ≥
³
Kffi + 2K
f
fj
´
(1 + β) from uj > 0. Adding these two we get,
2 (Ay +A3−y) ≥ (1 + β)
³
4Kffi + 2K
f
fj
´
. (3)
Also, we know from the geometry of the state space (Figure 1) that the minimum value of Ay (call
it Aminy ) is obtained from the intersection of lines A3−y − Aminy = 3K
f
fi (1− β) and A3−y + Aminy =³
Kffi + 2K
f
fj
´
(1 + β) . From these two equations we get Aminy = (1 + β)K
f
fj − (1− 2β)K
f
fi > 0. Hence,
2Ay ≥ (1 + β)Kffj − (1− 2β)K
f
fi. (4)
Adding inequalities (3) and (4) , we get
4Ay + 2A3−y ≥ 3 (1 + β)
³
Kffi +K
f
fj
´
+ 3βKifi ≥ 3 (1 + β)
³
Kffi +K
f
fj
´
, (5)
since β ≥ 0. This proves the non-negativity of prices in the two markets in Ω3.
Diﬀerence in demand states is very large with capacity constraint for firm i (areas Ω4,7).
We solve in Ω4 first. Firm i has a capacity constraint and the diﬀerence in the demand for the two
products is so large that firm imanufactures only one product. Firm j has no capacity constraint and can
manufacture both products. The values of various variables for firm i are as follows: qf2i = v3i = v1i = 0
with qf1i, ui,v2i > 0. For firm j, uj = v1j = v2j = 0 with the corresponding duals being positive. Solving
with the above parameters gives us v2i =
³
A1 −A2 − 3Kffi (1− β)
´
/2 > 0. From this condition we get
the defining equation for the region as A1 −A2 > 3Kffi (1− β) . Solving similarly for area Ω7, we get
bqfyi = Kffi, bqf(3−y)i = 0, bqfyj = Ay − βA3−y2 (1− β2) − K
f
fi
2
, bqf(3−y)j = A3−y − βAy2 (1− β2) ,
Py =
Ay −Kffi
2
, P3−y =
A3−y − βKffi
2
.
and A ∈Ω4,7 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω4 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω7. It is relatively straightforward to see that
the quantities and prices are non-negative.
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Firm i manufactures one product and firm j has a capacity constraint (areas Ω5,8).
We solve in Ω5 first. Firm i has a capacity constraint and manufactures only one product while
firm j, though capacity constrained, manufactures both products. The values of various variables for
firm i are as follows: qf2i = v3i = v1i = 0 with q
f
1i, ui,v2i > 0. For firm j, v3j = v1j = v2j = 0 with the
corresponding duals being positive. Again by forcing v2i > 0 we get the defining equation similar to the
one derived above. The complete solution for Ω5,8 is
bqfyi = Kffi, bqi3−y = 0, bqjy = Ay −A3−y4 (1− β) − K
f
fi
4
+
Kffj
2
, bqj3−y = A3−y −Ay4 (1− β) + K
f
fi
4
+
Kffj
2
,
Py =
3Ay +A3−y − (3 + β)Kffi − 2 (1 + β)K
f
fj
4
, P3−y =
Ay + 3A3−y − (1 + 3β)Kffi − 2 (1 + β)K
f
fj
4
.
and A ∈Ω5,8 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω5 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω8. It is straightforward to show that the
quantities are non-negative (follows from the boundary equations for these areas). Now Py ≥ 0, if
3Ay + A3−y ≥ (3 + β)Kffi + 2 (1 + β)K
f
fj . We know that for Ω5, Ay − A3−y ≥ 3K
f
fi (1− β) and
Ay +A3−y ≥
³
Kffi + 2K
f
fj
´
(1 + β) . Adding these two inequalities, we get
2Ay ≥ Kffi (4− 2β) +K
f
fj (2 + 2β) . (6)
Now, adding (6) and Ay +A3−y ≥
³
Kffi + 2K
f
fj
´
(1 + β) we get
3Ay +A3−y ≥ Kffi (5− β) + 2K
f
fj (2 + 2β) ≥ (3 + β)K
f
fi + 2 (1 + β)K
f
fj . (7)
To show P3−y ≥ 0, we need Ay+3A3−y ≥ (1 + 3β)Kffi+2 (1 + β)K
f
fj . This follows from Ay+A3−y ≥³
Kffi + 2K
f
fj
´
(1 + β) and 2A3−y ≥ 2βKffi.
Both firms are capacity constrained and manufacture one product (areas Ω6,9).
We solve in Ω6 first. Both firms are capacity constrained and the diﬀerence in demands is so high
that they manufacture only one product. The values of the parameters for firm i are qf2i = v3i = v1i = 0
and for firm j are qf2j = v3j = v1j = 0 with the corresponding duals being positive. The optimal
quantities and prices are
bqiy = Kffi, bqjy = Kffj , bqi3−y = bqj3−y = 0,
Py = Ay −
³
Kffi +K
f
fj
´
, P3−y = A3−y − β
³
Kffi +K
f
fj
´
,
where A ∈Ω6,9 with y = 1 for A ∈Ω6 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω9. Moreover,
v2i =
³
A1 −A2 − (1− β)
³
2Kffi +K
f
fj
´´
> 0 gives us A1 −A2 >
³
2Kffi +K
f
fj
´
(1− β) and forcing
v2j > 0 gives us A1 −A2 >
³
Kffi + 2K
f
fj
´
(1− β) . Since Kffj > K
f
fi the defining equation for the areas
is A1 −A2 >
³
Kffi + 2K
f
fj
´
(1− β) .
6
It is straightforward to see that the quantities and the prices are non-negative.
The FOC in the capacity game.
The first-order condition for firm i in the capacity game can be expressed as3
E
∂π
f
i
∂Kffi
= cf ⇒
X
l
ZZ
Ωl
∂π
f
i
∂Kffi
dF (x1, x2) = cf .
Diﬀerentiating the profit function w.r.t. Kffi in each area and using Leibniz’ Rule gives us the
first-order condition for firm i:
cf =
ZZ
Ω2
1
4
³
x1 + x2 − 2Kffi (1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2) (8)
+ (1/2)
ZZ
Ω3
³
x1 + x2 −
³
2Kffi +K
f
fj
´
(1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/2)
ZZ
Ω4
³
x1 − 2Kffi
´
dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/4)
ZZ
Ω5
³
3x1 + x2 − 2 (3 + β)Kffi − 2K
f
fj (1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω6
³
x1 − 2Kffi −K
f
fj
´
dF (x1, x2) + (1/2)
ZZ
Ω7
³
x2 − 2Kffi
´
dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/4)
ZZ
Ω8
³
x1 + 3x2 − 2 (3 + β)Kffi − 2K
f
fj (1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω9
³
x2 − 2Kffi −K
f
fj
´
dF (x1, x2),
and similarly for firm j:
cf = (1/2)
ZZ
Ω3
³
x1 + x2 −
³
Kffi + 2K
f
fj
´
(1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/2)
ZZ
Ω5,8
³
x1 + x2 − (1 + β)
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω6
³
x1 − 2Kffj −K
f
fi
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω9
³
x2 − 2Kffj −K
f
fi
´
dF (x1, x2).
3Note that we interchanged diﬀerentiation and integration. This is justified if the function under diﬀerentia-
tion/integration is Lipschitz-continuous of order one (see Glasserman 1994). This is easily verified since the first derivative
is clearly bounded.
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In the following proposition, we show uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium. Proving uniqueness
for an asymmetric capacity investment is diﬃcult because one needs to diﬀerentiate the first-order
conditions and these are not continuous at the boundaries of the various regions when capacities are
asymmetric. Since the boundaries are themselves functions of the capacities of the two firms, diﬀerenti-
ating the first-order conditions does not result in tractable expressions. However, above we did obtain
the optimality conditions for the capacity game without assuming symmetry. Therefore, all asymmetric
equilibria can be found numerically (or in closed form for some probability distributions). The same
comment applies for the pure dedicated market analyzed in the next section.
Proposition TA 1 Equilibrium in the capacity game for the pure flexible market exists and the
symmetric equilibrium is unique ∀β ∈ (−1, 1) .
Proof. The concavity of the objective functions was demonstrated by Chod and Rudi (2004), which
immediately implies existence of the equilibrium. Uniqueness is proved by showing that the slope of
the best-response function for each firm is less than one (Cachon and Netessine 2004). Using implicit
diﬀerentiation, the absolute value of the slope of the best-response function for, say firm j, is found as¯¯¯
∂2Πfj /∂K
f
fi∂K
f
fj
¯¯¯
/
¯¯¯¯
∂2Πfj /∂
³
Kffj
´2 ¯¯¯¯
.
Note that for a symmetric case, Figure 1 simplifies into Figure 2 (which is a special case of Figure 3 for
β = 0) and hence areas 4, 5, 7 and 8 disappear. It is easy to check that the integrands in equation (8) are
continuous at the boundaries of the areas once we assume symmetry. For instance, the boundary of areas
3 and 6 is given as A1 − A2 =
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´
(1− β) . Evaluating the integrands of Ω3 and Ω6 (say for
firm j) at this boundary gives (1/2)
³
2x2 +
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´
(1− β − 1− β)
´
=
³
x2 − β
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´´
for Ω3 and
³
x2 −
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´
(1− 1 + β)
´
=
³
x2 − β
³
2Kffj +K
f
fi
´´
for Ω6. Hence, we can safely
ignore diﬀerentiating the limits of the integrals when we apply Leibniz’ Rule as the corresponding terms
get cancelled.
Now, ¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ∂2Πfj
∂
³
Kffj
´2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ = ZZ
Ω3
(1 + β) dF (x1, x2) + 2
ZZ
Ω6,9
dF (x1, x2),
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ∂2Πfj
∂Kffi∂K
f
fj
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ = 12
ZZ
Ω3
(1 + β) dF (x1, x2) +
ZZ
Ω6,9
dF (x1, x2).
Clearly,
¯¯¯
∂2Πfj /∂K
f
fi∂K
f
fj
¯¯¯
/
¯¯¯¯
∂2Πj/∂
³
Kffj
´2 ¯¯¯¯
= 1/2 < 1. Similarly, for firm i.
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Hence, the symmetric equilibrium in the capacity game is unique for all β ∈ (−1, 1). The first-order
conditions simplify to (Kffi = K
f
fj = K
f
f ):
cf = (1/2)
ZZ
Ω3
³
x1 + x2 − 3Kff (1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2) (9)
+
ZZ
Ω6
³
x1 − 3Kff
´
dF (x1, x2) +
ZZ
Ω9
³
x2 − 3Kff
´
dF (x1, x2).
We now solve for the optimal capacity and profit for a firm in the pure flexible market under as-
sumptions A-1 through A-3.
Proposition TA 2 Under assumptions A-1 through A-3, for firms operating in the pure flexible
market,
(i) the MPNE in capacity is
Kff =
(µ1 + µ2 − 2cf )
3 (1 + β)
,
(ii) the expected profit at equilibrium is
Πff =
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
18 (1− β) +
(µ1 − cf )2 + (µ2 − cf )2
9 (1 + β)
,
(iii) the expected price for product y = 1, 2 is P fy = (µy + 2cf ) /3.
Proof. The first-order condition from (9) under symmetry (i.e. Kffi = K
f
fj = K
f
f ) can be written
using assumption A-3 as
cf = (1/2)
ZZ
Ω
³
x1 + x2 − 3Kff (1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2) +
+ (1/2)
ZZ
Ω6
³
2
³
x1 − 3Kff
´
−
³
x1 + x2 − 3Kff (1 + β)
´´
dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/2)
ZZ
Ω9
³
2
³
x2 − 3Kff
´
−
³
x1 + x2 − 3Kff (1 + β)
´´
dF (x1, x2),
where Ω represents the entire state space. Using A-2 and A-1 we can further simplify it
(1/2)
ZZ
Ω
³
x1 + x2 − 3Kff (1 + β)
´
f1(x1)f2(x2)dx1dx2 = cf ,
9
and the result for the capacity follows. Further, under assumptions A-1 through A-3 the expression for
the firm’s profit becomes
Πfi =
µ
1
6
¶ZZ
Ω


2X
y=1
³
4xy + 2x3−y − 6 (1 + β)Kff
´µ(xy − x3−y)
(1− β) + 3K
f
f
¶
fy(xy)f3−y(x3−y)dx1dx2

−cfKff .
After substituting the expression for the equilibrium capacity into the equation for profit, the result
follows after tedious algebra.
2 The pure dedicated market.
Figures 4 and 5 below represent the state-space for a pure dedicated market. The figures are drawn for
β = 0. In the interest of simplicity, the modified state-space representation for β 6= 0 is omitted here.
However, for β 6= 0, the same precautions and comments apply in the pure dedicated market as are
applicable in the pure flexible market (see Section 4.4 of the main paper).
A2
A1
  2 11
d
i
d
j KK +
1
7 9
3
     3 2
d
iK
4 65
2
8
Firm i
Firm j
     3 1
d
iK
  2 22
d
i
d
j KK +
Figure 4. Pure dedicated market - asymmetric solution.
A2
A1
     3 1
dK
1
34
2
     3 2
dK
Figure 5. Pure dedicated market - symmetric solution.
Suppose that both firms invest in dedicated technology, i.e., there is a dedicated production line
for each product (see Figures 4 and 5). Note the assumption that the capacity investment for firm j
is higher than that of firm i in both markets. It needs to be emphasized that this is in not a unique
representation. For instance, the capacity of firm j could be higher than firm i in one market but lower
in another. We could solve the production game in closed form for any of these scenarios. However, the
above assumption is for expositional convenience only. Later we restrict our attention to the symmetric
equilibrium, which is shown to be unique.
Compared to the pure flexible market, the interpretations of the areas in Figure 4 are much simpler.
For instance, area Ω1 represents no capacity constraint for either firm. In areas Ω2 and Ω4, firm i has
capacity constraint for products 1 and 2 respectively while firm j has no capacity constraint for either.
Since in each area the production game can be solved uniquely, the MPNE in the production game is
10
trivially unique.
The Lagrangian can be written as:
maxLdi (q
d
1i, q
d
2i,u) =
2X
y=1
(Ay − (Qy + βQ3−y)) qdyi − uyi(qdyi −Kdyi).
A similar expression can be obtained for firm j with the Lagrange multipliers u1j and u2j . The KKT
conditions for firm i are:
A1 − 2qd1i − qd1j − β
³
qd2i + q
d
2j
´
− βqd2i − u1i + v1i = 0,
qd1iv1i = 0,
A2 − 2qd2i − qd2j − β
³
qd1i + q
d
1j
´
− βqd1i − u2i + v2i = 0,
qd2iv2i = 0,
qd1i + v3i = K
d
1i,
v3iu1i = 0,
qd2i + v4i = K
d
2i,
v4iu2i = 0,
where vli, l = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the slack variables. We now provide closed-form solutions for the optimal
quantities, while the equilibrium profits can be obtained from (1). All quantities are positive and hence,
unless specified otherwise, vli = vlj = 0 for all l.
Capacity is not binding (area Ω1).
uli = ulj = 0 for l = 1, 2. The optimal production quantities are
bqdyi = bqdyj = Ay −A3−yβ3 (1− β2) .
Capacity is binding for one product for firm i (areas Ω2,4).
For Ω2, u2i = 0 and ukj = 0 for k = 1, 2. However, since capacity binds for product 1 for firm i,
u1i > 0. The corresponding duals are positive by complementary slackness. Solving for quantities we
get
bqdyi = Kdyi, bqd(3−y)i = A3−y − 3βKdyi3 , bqdyj = Ay − βA3−y −K
d
yi
¡
1− β2
¢
2 (1− β2) ,
bqd(3−y)j = A3−y
¡
2 + β2
¢
− 3βAy
6 (1− β2) +
βKdyi
2
.
and A ∈Ω2,4 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω2 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω4.
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Capacity is binding for both products for firm i (area Ω5).
We have u1i, u2i > 0, u1j = u2j = 0. Other variables are positive by complementary slackness and
production quantities are
bqd1i = Kd1i, bqd2i = Kd2i, bqd1j = A1 − βA2 − ¡1− β2¢Kd1i2 (1− β2) , bqd2j = A2 − βA1 −
¡
1− β2
¢
Kd2i
2 (1− β2) .
Capacity is binding for both firms for the same product (areas Ω3,7).
For Ω3 we have u1i, u1j > 0, u2i = u2j = 0 and more generally:
bqdyi = Kdyi, bqd(3−y)i = A3−y − 3βKdyi3 , bqdyj = Kdyj , bqd(3−y)j = A3−y − 3βK
d
yj
3
,
and A ∈Ω3,7 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω3 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω7.
Capacity is binding for one product for firm j and both products for firm i (areas Ω6,8).
For Ω6 we have u1i, u2i > 0, u2j = 0, u1j > 0. Other variables are non-zero by complementary
slackness and we obtain
bqdyi = Kdyi, bqd(3−y)i = Kd(3−y)i, bqdyj = Kdyj , bqd(3−y)j = A3−y −Kd(3−y)i − β(Kdyi + 2Kdyj)2 ,
and A ∈Ω6,8 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω6 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω8.
Capacity is binding for both products for both firms (area Ω9).
We have uli, ulj > 0 for l = 1, 2. The optimal solution is simply
bqdyi = Kdyi; bqdyj = Kdyj .
The FOC in the capacity game.
For firm i, the first-order condition can be expressed as ∂
³
Eπdi
´
/∂Kdyi = c which translates into
c = (1/2)
ZZ
Ω2
³
x1 − x2β − 2
³
1− β2
´
Kd1i
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω3
³
x1 − βx2 −
³
1− β2
´³
2Kd1i +K
d
1j
´´
dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/2)
ZZ
Ω5
³
x1 − 2Kd1i − 2βKd2i
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω6
³
x1 −
³
2Kd1i +K
d
1j
´
+ β
³
−x2 + 2β
³
Kd1i +K
d
1j
´
− 2Kd2i
´
/2
´
dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/2)
ZZ
Ω8
³
x1 − 2βKd2i − 2Kd1i
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω9
³
x1 −
³
2Kd1i +K
d
1j
´
− β
³
2Kd2i +K
d
2j
´´
dF (x1, x2).
12
Analogously, ∂E
³
πdi
´
/∂Kf2i = c yields:
c = (1/2)
ZZ
Ω4
³
x2 − x1β − 2
³
1− β2
´
Kd2i
´
dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/2)
ZZ
Ω5
³
x2 − 2Kd2i − 2βKd1i
´
dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/2)
ZZ
Ω6
³
x2 − 2βKd1i − 2Kd2i
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω7
³
x2 − βx1 −
³
1− β2
´³
2Kd2i +K
d
2j
´´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω8
³
x2 −
³
2Kd2i +K
d
2j
´
+ β
³
−x1 + 2β
³
Kd2i +K
d
2j
´
− 2Kd1i
´
/2
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω9
³
x2 −
³
2Kd2i +K
d
2j
´
− β
³
2Kd1i +K
d
1j
´´
dF (x1, x2).
For firm j, E
³
∂πdj /∂K
d
1j
´
= c translates into:
c =
ZZ
Ω3,6
h
x1 − βx2 −
³
1− β2
´³
2Kd1j +K
d
1i
´i
dF (x1, x2) (10)
+
ZZ
Ω9
h
x1 −
³
2Kd1j +K
d
1i
´
− β
³
2Kd2j +K
d
2i
´i
dF (x1, x2),
and finally from E
³
∂πdj /∂K
d
2j
´
= c we get
c =
ZZ
Ω7,8
h
x2 − βx1 −
³
1− β2
´³
2Kd2j +K
d
2i
´i
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω9
h
x2 −
³
2Kd2j +K
d
2i
´
− β
³
2Kd1j +K
d
1i
´i
dF (x1, x2).
The following proposition states the existence and the uniqueness of equilibrium in the capacity
game.
Proposition TA 3 Equilibrium in the capacity game for the pure dedicated market exists ∀β ∈
(−1, 1) and the symmetric equilibrium is unique for β ∈ (−1, 1/3) .
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Proof. It can be easily verified that each objective function is concave so a pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium exists. The Hessian for this game can be written as:
Hd =


∂2Πdi
∂(Kd1i)
2
∂2Πdi
∂Kd1i∂K
d
2i
∂2Πdi
∂Kd1i∂K
d
1j
∂2Πdi
∂Kd1i∂K
d
2j
∂2Πdi
∂Kd1i∂K
d
2i
∂2Πdi
∂(Kd2i)
2
∂2Πdi
∂Kd2i∂K
d
1j
∂2Πdi
∂Kd2i∂K
d
2j
∂2Πdj
∂Kd1j∂K
d
1i
∂2Πdj
∂Kd1j∂K
d
2i
∂2Πdj
∂(Kd1j)
2
∂2Πdj
∂Kd1j∂K
d
2j
∂2Πdj
∂Kd2j∂K
d
1i
∂2Πdj
∂Kd2j∂K
d
2i
∂2Πdj
∂Kd2j∂K
d
1j
∂2Πdj
∂(Kd2j)
2


.
Following Cachon and Netessine (2004), a condition suﬃcient for the uniqueness of the Nash equi-
librium is the diagonal dominance that translates into¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ∂2Πdi
∂
³
Kdyi
´2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ > ¯¯¯¯¯ ∂2Πdi∂Kdyi∂Kd(3−y)i
¯¯¯¯
¯+
¯¯¯¯
¯ ∂2Πdi∂Kdyi∂Kdyj
¯¯¯¯
¯+
¯¯¯¯
¯ ∂2Πdi∂Kdyi∂Kd(3−y)j
¯¯¯¯
¯ , y = 1, 2, (11)¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ∂2Πdj
∂
³
Kdyj
´2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ > ¯¯¯¯¯ ∂
2Πdj
∂Kdyj∂K
d
(3−y)j
¯¯¯¯
¯+
¯¯¯¯
¯ ∂
2Πdj
∂Kdyj∂K
d
yi
¯¯¯¯
¯+
¯¯¯¯
¯ ∂
2Πdj
∂Kdyj∂K
d
(3−y)i
¯¯¯¯
¯ , y = 1, 2. (12)
Because of symmetry assumption, we show the analysis for one firm only (say firm j). We re-write
the first-order conditions (10) for firm j for the symmetric case (note that Figure 4 changes to Figure
5). These are
c =
ZZ
Ω2
h
x1 − βx2 −
³
1− β2
´³
2Kd1j +K
d
1i
´i
dF (x1, x2) (13)
+
ZZ
Ω3
h
x1 −
³
2Kd1j +K
d
1i
´
− β
³
2Kd2j +K
d
2i
´i
dF (x1, x2),
and
c =
ZZ
Ω4
h
x2 − βx1 −
³
1− β2
´³
2Kd2j +K
d
2i
´i
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω3
h
x2 −
³
2Kd2j +K
d
2i
´
− β
³
2Kd1j +K
d
1i
´i
dF (x1, x2).
The numbering of the areas is now with respect to Figure 5. We again verify that the integrands
are continuous across the areas. To show a specific case, take areas 2 and 3 of Figure 5. The boundary
condition is A2 = β
³
Kd1i + 2K
d
1j
´
+
³
Kd2i + 2K
d
2j
´
. The integrand of Ω2 in equation (13) reduces to
x1 −
³
2Kd1j +K
d
1i
´
− β
³
2Kd2j +K
d
2i
´
which is the same as the integrand of Ω3. Hence, we ignore the
limits while diﬀerentiating using Leibniz’ Rule.
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Next we derive conditions for (12) to hold. We first show the result for y = 1 :¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ∂2Πdj
∂
³
Kd1j
´2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ = ZZ
Ω2
2
³
1− β2
´
dF (x1, x2) +
ZZ
Ω3
2dF (x1, x2),
¯¯¯¯
¯ ∂
2Πdj
∂Kd1j∂K
d
2j
¯¯¯¯
¯ =
ZZ
Ω3
2βdF (x1, x2),
¯¯¯¯
¯ ∂
2Πdj
∂Kd1j∂K
d
1i
¯¯¯¯
¯ =
ZZ
Ω2
³
1− β2
´
dF (x1, x2) +
ZZ
Ω3
1dF (x1, x2),
¯¯¯¯
¯ ∂
2Πdj
∂Kd1j∂K
d
2i
¯¯¯¯
¯ =
ZZ
Ω3
βdF (x1, x2).
It is straightforward to show that the inequality holds for each of the areas except for Ω3. For the
inequality to hold in Ω3 we need β < 1/3. The same result for y = 2 can be shown analogously. Hence,
there is a unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium in the capacities for β ∈ (−1, 1/3).
The symmetric first-order conditions can now be represented as (see Figure 5 with Kdyi = K
d
yj = K
d
y )
c =
ZZ
Ω2
³
x1 − βx2 −
³
1− β2
´ ³
3Kdy
´´
dF (x1, x2) +
ZZ
Ω3
³
x1 − 3Kdy (1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2), (14)
c =
ZZ
Ω4
³
x2 − βx1 −
³
1− β2
´ ³
3Kdy
´´
dF (x1, x2) +
ZZ
Ω3
³
x2 − 3Kdy (1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2).
Proposition TA 4 Under assumptions A1-A3, for firms operating in a pure dedicated market,
(i) the MPNE in capacity is
Kdy =
(µy − c)
3 (1 + β)
, y = 1, 2,
(ii) the expected profit at equilibrium is
Πdi =
(µ1 − c)2 + (µ2 − c)2
9 (1 + β)
, i = 1, 2,
(iii) the expected price for a product y = 1, 2 is P dy = (µy + 2c) /3.
Proof. From equation (14) , the symmetric first-order conditions in a pure dedicated market can be
written as
c =
ZZ
Ω3
³
x1 − 3Kdy (1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2),
c =
ZZ
Ω3
³
x2 − 3Kdy (1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2).
The expressions for capacities and profits follow after tedious algebra.
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3 The mixed market.
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Figure 6. The mixed market.
Suppose that firm i decides to invest in dedicated capacity and firm j decides to invest in flexible
capacity. We alter our notation for the purpose of this section only: for clarity we remove the sub-
scripts i and j (subscripts d and f will be used if necessary for the flexible and the dedicated firm). For
instance, Km1 represents dedicated capacity for product 1 and q
m
1f represents the quantity of product
one produced by the flexible firm. Similar to the previous two cases, a number of areas arise due to
the capacity constraints of both firms (see Figure 6)4 and the production game can be solved uniquely
for each area. However, this is not a unique representation (i.e., there are other possibilities that could
give rise to a diﬀerent set of areas). Figure 6 is based on the assumption that Km1 > K
m
f > K
m
2 . For
instance, there could be an area 4 similar to area 3 instead of area 12 in the figure. The presence of
these areas depends on the assumptions on the capacity levels for the firms. Hence, Figure 6 is only
a schematic representation of how the areas are placed with respect to each other. However, because
there are multiple representations of the state-space, we suspect that there might be multiple equilibria
in the capacity game in the mixed market associated with each such representation.
The areas in Figure 6 have intuitive explanations. For instance, in area Ω1 no firm has a capacity
constraint, while in area Ω2 the flexible firm has a capacity constraint. In area Ω3, the dedicated firm
has a capacity constraint for product 1, etc.
Using the methodology below, one can solve for all possible ways of representing the mixed market.
For ease of understanding, some of the areas can be referenced back to Figure 6. Others (like area Ω4)
which do not find representation in Figure 6, can be understood from the text detailing what they stand
4Figure 6 represents the state-space for a mixed market for β = 0. The modified state-space representation for β 6= 0 is
omitted for simplicity.
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for.
The Lagrangian formulation for the flexible firm is
maxLmf (uf , q
m
1f , q
m
2f ) =
2X
y=1
(Ay − (Qy + βQ3−y)) qmyf − uf (qm1f + qm2f −Kmf ).
The KKT conditions are (since the objective function is concave these are also suﬃcient):
A1 − 2qm1f − qm1d − β
³
qm2f + q
m
2d
´
− βqm2f − uf + v1f = 0,
v1fq
m
1f = 0,
A2 − 2qm2f − qm2d − β
³
qm1f + q
m
1d
´
− βqm1f − uf + v2f = 0,
v2fq
m
2f = 0,
qm1f + q
m
2f + v3f = K
m
f ,
ufv3f = 0,
where vlf are the slack variables for l = 1, 2, 3. For the dedicated firm, the Lagrangian is
maxLmd (q
m
1d, q
m
2d,u) =
2X
y=1
³
(Ay − (Qy + βQ3−y)) qdyi − uyd(qmyd −Kmy )
´
.
The KKT conditions for the firm employing dedicated technology are:
A1 − 2qm1d − qm1f − β
³
qm2d + q
m
2f
´
− βqm2d − u1d + v1d = 0,
qm1dv1d = 0,
A2 − 2qm2d − qm2f − β
³
qm1d + q
m
1f
´
− βqm1d − u2d + v2d = 0,
qm2dv2d = 0,
qm1d + v3d = K
m
1 ,
v3du1d = 0,
qm2d + v4d = K
m
2 ,
v4du2d = 0,
where vld, l = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the slack variables. We proceed by finding the optimal production quanti-
ties. Unless otherwise specified, the quantities are all positive and hence vlf = vld = 0, l = 1, 2. Similar
in spirit to the case of a pure flexible market, the Lagrange multipliers often define the boundary con-
ditions for the various areas of integration. For the sake of simplicity, we do not show the values of the
Lagrange multipliers whenever they are positive. We do, however, show some interesting cases below
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in which the slack variables are positive.
Capacity is not binding (area Ω1).
uf = u1d = u2d = 0. The unconstrained solution is
bqmyf = bqmyd = Ay −A3−yβ3 (1− β2) , y = 1, 2.
Only the flexible firm is capacity constrained (area Ω2).
For the flexible firm uf > 0. For the dedicated firm ukd = 0 for k = 1, 2. The optimal production
quantities are:
bqmyf = Ay −A3−y6 (1− β) + K
m
f
2
for y = 1, 2,
bqmyd = (5− β)Ay +A3−y (1− 5β)12 (1− β2) − K
m
f
4
for y = 1, 2.
The flexible firm is not capacity constrained while the dedicated firm is capacity con-
strained for both products (area Ω2˜).
Note that this area is not represented in Figure 6. Here, uf = 0 and ukd > 0 for k = 1, 2. The
optimal production quantities are
bqmyf = Ay − βA3−y −Kmy
¡
1− β2
¢
2
, for y = 1, 2,
bqmyd = Kmy .
The flexible firm is not capacity constrained while the dedicated firm is constrained for
product 2 for area Ω3 and product 1 for area Ω4.
Area Ω4 is not in Figure 6. For the flexible firm uf = 0 with the corresponding duals being non-zero.
For the dedicated firm we have uyd = 0 and u(3−y)d > 0. In what follows, y = 1 for area Ω3 and y = 2
for area Ω4. Solving for quantities we get:
bqmyf = Ay
¡
2 + β2
¢
− 3βA3−y + 3βKm(3−y)
¡
1− β2
¢
6 (1− β2) ,
bqm(3−y)f = A3−y − βAy −Km(3−y)
¡
1− β2
¢
2 (1− β2) ,
bqmyd = Ay − 3βKm(3−y)3 , bqm(3−y)d = Km(3−y).
Capacity is binding for the flexible firm and for one product for the dedicated firm
(area Ω5,6).
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For the flexible firm uf > 0. For the dedicated firm, uyd > 0 and u(3−y)d = 0 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω5
and y = 2 for A ∈Ω6. The solution is:
bqmyf = 2Ay −A(3−y) (1 + β)− 2Kmy (1− β2) + 3Kmf (1− β)7− β (6 + β) ,
bqm(3−y)f = −2Ay +A3−y (1 + β) + 2Kmy
¡
1− β2
¢
+Kmf
¡
4− 3β − β2
¢
7− β (6 + β) ,
bqmyd = Kmy , bqm(3−y)d = Ay + 3A3−y −Kmy (1 + 7β)− 2Kmf (1 + β)7 + β ,
and A ∈Ω5,6 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω5 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω6.
Capacity is binding for the flexible firm and for one product for the dedicated firm.
The flexible firm manufactures one product (areas Ω7,8).
In area Ω7 the diﬀerence in demand realizations is so high that the flexible firm manufactures only
product 1. Hence, for the flexible firm, uf > 0 and v2f > 0 so that bqm2f = 0. For the dedicated firm
u1d > 0. Upon solving we get v2f = (1/2)
³
2A1 −A2 (1 + β) − 2Km1
¡
1− β2
¢
− Kmf
¡
4− 3β − β2
¢´
>
0. For β = 0 this reduces to the boundary condition 2A1 −A2 > 2Km1 +4Kmf as is evident in Figure 6.
The optimal quantities are:
bqmyf = Kmf , bqm(3−y)f = 0, bqmyd = Kmy , bqm(3−y)d = ³A3−y − 2βKmy − βKmf ´ /2,
and A ∈Ω7,8 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω7 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω8.
Capacity is binding for the flexible firm and for both products for the dedicated firm.
The flexible firm manufactures one product (areas Ω9,10).
The only change from the preceding case is that for the dedicated firm we have u1d, u2d > 0. Solving
in area Ω9 we get v2f = A1 −A2 − (Km1 −Km2 + 2Kmf ) (1− β) > 0. From here we obtain the boundary
condition for these areas as shown in Figure 6. Solving for the optimal quantities, we get:
bqmyf = Kmf , bqm(3−y)f = 0, bqmyd = Kmy , bqm(3−y)d = Km(3−y),
and A ∈Ω9,10 where y = 1 for A ∈Ω9 and y = 2 for A ∈Ω10.
Both firms are capacity constrained (area Ω11).
All slack variables are zero for both firms. Solving for quantities we get
bqmyf = Ay −A3−y4 (1− β) +
³
Km(3−y) −Kmy
´
4
+
Kmf
2
, bqmyd = Kmy , y = 1, 2.
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The flexible firm is capacity constrained and manufactures one product: product 1 for
area Ω12 and product 2 for area Ω13.
Area Ω13 is not in Figure 6. Take y = 1 for area Ω12 and y = 2 for area Ω13. For the flexible firm,
uf > 0 and v(3−y)f > 0 so that bqm(3−y)f = 0. For the dedicated firm, uld = 0 for l = 1, 2. Solving we get
v(3−y)f = (1/2)
³
Ay −A3−y − 3Kmf (1− β)
´
> 0 which gives us the boundary condition for this area.
The optimal production quantities are:
bqmyf = Kmf , bqm(3−y)f = 0, bqmyd = Ay −A(3−y)β −Kmf
¡
1− β2
¢
2 (1− β2) ,
bqm(3−y)d = A3−y −Ayβ2 (1− β2) .
The FOC in the capacity game.
For the flexible firm, the FOC is given by E
³
∂πmf /∂K
m
f
´
= cf , which translates into:
cf =
ZZ
Ω2
1
4
³
x1 + x2 − 2Kmf (1 + β)
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω5
1
(7 + β)2

 (17− β)x1 + (16− β (1− β))x2
+(−17 + β) (1 + β) ((1− β)Km1 + 2Kmf )

 dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω6
1
(7 + β)2

 (17− β)x2 + (16− β (1− β))x1
+(−17 + β) (1 + β) ((1− β)Km2 + 2Kmf )

 dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω7
³
x1 − (βx2/2)−
³
1− β2
´
Km1 − (2− β2)Kmf
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω8
³
x2 − (βx1/2)−
³
1− β2
´
Km2 − (2− β2)Kmf
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω9
³
x1 −Km1 − βKm2 − 2Kmf
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω10
³
x2 −Km2 − βKm1 − 2Kmf
´
dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/2)
ZZ
Ω11
³
x1 + x2 − (1 + β)
³
Km1 +K
m
2 + 2K
m
f
´´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω12
1
2
³
x1 − 2Kmf
´
dF (x1, x2) +
ZZ
Ω13
1
2
³
x2 − 2Kmf
´
dF (x1, x2).
For the dedicated firm we have ∂E (πmd ) /∂K
m
1 = c, which translates into
c = (1/2)
ZZ
Ω2ˆ
(x1 − 2 (Km1 + βKm2 )) dF (x1, x2) + (1/2)
ZZ
Ω4
³
x1 − x2β − 2
³
1− β2
´
Km1
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
1
(7 + β)2
ZZ
Ω5

 (33− β (2− β))x1 + (1− β (34− β))x2
− (17− β)
¡
1− β2
¢ ³
4Km1 +K
m
f
´

 dF (x1, x2)
20
+ZZ
Ω7
³
x1 − βx2 −
³
1− β2
´ ³
2Km1 +K
m
f
´´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω9
³
x1 −
³
2Km1 + 2βK
m
2 +K
m
f
´´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω10
³
x1 −
³
2Km1 + 2βK
m
2 + βK
m
f
´´
dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/4)
ZZ
Ω11
³
3x1 + x2 − 2
³
(3 + β)Km1 + (1 + 3β)K
m
2 + (1 + β)K
m
f
´´
dF (x1, x2),
and ∂E (πmd ) /∂K
m
2 = c yields:
c = (1/2)
ZZ
Ω2ˆ
(x2 − 2 (βKm1 +Km2 )) dF (x1, x2) + (1/2)
ZZ
Ω3
³
x2 − x1β − 2
³
1− β2
´
Km2
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
1
(7 + β)2
ZZ
Ω6

 (33− β (2− β))x2 + (1− β (34− β))x1
− (17− β)
¡
1− β2
¢ ³
4Km2 +K
m
f
´

 dF (x1, x2)
+ (1/4)
ZZ
Ω11
³
3x2 + x1 − 2
³
(3 + β)Km2 + (1 + 3β)K
m
1 + (1 + β)K
m
f
´´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω8
³
x2 − βx1 −
³
1− β2
´ ³
2Km2 +K
m
f
´´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω9
³
x2 − 2Km2 − 2βKm1 − βKmf
´
dF (x1, x2)
+
ZZ
Ω10
³
x2 − 2Km2 − 2βKm1 −Kmf
´
dF (x1, x2).
Proposition TA 5 Equilibrium in the capacity game for the mixed market exists for all β ∈ (−1, 1) .
Existence follows from the concavity of the objective functions, which can be easily verified. Unique-
ness is analytically diﬃcult to show in this case as there is no symmetry argument that we can invoke.
In fact, we conjecture that for a holdback strategy, the equilibrium in the mixed market may not be
unique. This follows from the fact that there is more than one way to represent the capacity of the two
firms as detailed by Figure 6 and, as we pointed out in the body of the paper, Figure 6 is not a unique
representation.
Proposition TA 6 For the firms operating in the mixed market:
(i) the MPNE in capacity for a
(a) flexible firm is: Kmf = (µ1 + µ2 + 2c− 4cf ) /3 (1 + β) ,
(b) dedicated firm is: Kmy = (5µy − µ3−y + 4cf − 8c) /12 (1 + β) , y = 1, 2,
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(ii) the expected profit at equilibrium for a
(a) flexible firm is: Πmf =
¡
σ21 + σ
2
2
¢
/8 (1− β)+(µ1−µ2)2/32 (1 + β)+(µ1 + µ2 + 2c− 4cf )2 /18 (1 + β) ,
(b) dedicated firm is: Πmd = (µ1 − µ2)2/16 (1 + β) + (µ1 + µ2 + 2cf − 4c)
2 /18 (1 + β) ,
(iii) the expected price for product y = 1, 2 is Pmy = (7µ1 + µ2 + 8cf + 8c) /24.
Proof. For the mixed market under assumptions A-2 and A-3, the optimality condition of the firm
investing into flexible technology is:
(1/2)
ZZ
Ω
³
x1 + x2 − (1 + β) (Km1 +Km2 )− 2Kmf
´
dF (x1, x2) = cf ,
while the profit is
Πmf =
1
16 (1− β)2
ZZ
Ω


2X
y=1
³
(3− 4β)xy + x3−y − (1− β)
³
3Kmy +K
m
3−y + 2K
m
f
´´
×
³
xy − x3−y + (1− β)
³
Km3−y −Kmy
´
+ 2Kmf
´i
dF (x1, x2)− cfKmf .
The optimality conditions of the firm investing into dedicated technology are:
(1/4)
ZZ
Ω
³
3xy + x3−y − 2
³
(3 + β)Kmy + (1 + 3β)K
m
3−y + (1 + β)K
m
f
´´
dF (x1, x2)dF (x1, x2) = c, y = 1, 2
while the profit is
Πmd =
2X
y=1


µ
1
4 (1− β)
¶ZZ
Ω
³
(3− 4β)xy + x3−y − (1− β)
³
3Kmy +K
m
3−y + 2K
m
f
´´
Kmy dF (x1, x2)− cKmy

 .
The results follow after some algebra.
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